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Abstract
As spacecraft become more complex and autonomous, the need for reliable fault
protection will become more prevalent. When coupled with the additional requirement of
limiting cost, the task of implementing fault protection on spacecraft becomes extremely
challenging. The current state-of-the-art Cassini fault protection software, for example, is a
testament to the complexity and difficulty of implementing fault protection on spacecraft. This
paper describes how domain knowledge about spacecraft fault protection can be captured and
stored in a reusable, component-based spacecraft architecture. The spacecraft-level fault
protection strategy for a new spacecraft can then be created by composing generic component
specifications, each with component-level fault protection included. The resulting fault
protection design can be validated by formal analysis and simulation before any costly
implementation begins. As spacecraft technology improves, new generic fault protection logic
may be added, allowing active improvements to be made to the foundation.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The Problem
Spacecraft science missions have traditionally been unique entities. The challenges of
sending a probe to Saturn can be quite different from the challenges of rendezvousing with a
comet. The uniqueness of each mission drives unique requirements for each spacecraft. These
requirements in turn contribute to the diverse designs of spacecraft.
The unique design of each spacecraft is perhaps the single greatest challenge to
developing cost-effective and reliable spacecraft fault protection software. Fault protection is
system specific and traditionally cannot be designed or written until there is adequate
information about the detailed spacecraft design. In addition, the process of designing a
spacecraft is iterative, requiring many rounds of redesign: The design of the spacecraft in the
initial design phases is likely to be very different from the final design. For this reason, fault
protection software is often not implemented until the very end of the spacecraft design phase.
This delay means that the fault protection software usually is developed as a separate and distinct
entity from the rest of the spacecraft software design and by a separate group of engineers.
These engineers may not have adequate first hand knowledge of the components for which they
are designing the fault-protection, raising concerns about the correctness of the fault protection.
Ideally, the engineers designing the Attitude Determination and Control Subsystem (ADCS), for
example, should also design the fault protection software for the ADCS. This goal is difficult to
achieve at the present time.
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1.2. Related Work
The Mission Data System (MDS) is a project currently being developed at NASA's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). The aim of the project is to define and develop an advanced multi-
mission end-to-end information architecture for deep space missions [2]. At the core of MDS is
the idea of a state variable, which is a software object that captures information about the state of
external observations of the system. State variables can be defined for almost any spacecraft
property such as the state of a device (On/Off), physical properties such as the spacecraft
attitude, temperature, mass, and tank pressure, or spacecraft parameters such as calibration
coefficients. Using state variables, MDS forms goals, which are simply state variables with
prioritized constraints in a given time interval. An example of a goal would be to be at a certain
attitude during a particular time frame. Multiple goals combine in a hierarchy to form closed-
loop control of spacecraft functions. The process of achieving goals involves elaborating high-
level goals into lower-level achievable goals. As an example, the high-level goal of achieving a
particular spacecraft attitude would be elaborated into low-level closed-loop command and
control of individual attitude determination devices such as reaction wheels or reaction thrusters.
In MDS, fault protection is an integral part of the spacecraft design [7]. Fault protection
is a result of the goal achievement process. Goals are achieved when an estimated state variable
matches the observed state variable. If a goal is not met through the first elaboration of low-level
goals, MDS searches for other ways to achieve the goal. In addition, the operational state of
individual components such as a valve that has become stuck is explicitly modeled as state
variables. Using this information and the result of the goal elaboration control, MDS determines
and isolates the failed component, then reconfigures the system in order to achieve the high-level
goal.
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The objective of MDS is to provide a cost-effective way of developing spacecraft system
software by specifying high-level goals, which can be elaborated and implemented with relative
ease during spacecraft design or carried out autonomously onboard the spacecraft during its
operation. By specifying high-level goals, the cost of developing expensive low-level code is
minimized or eliminated. At present, MDS is still under development and no formal study has
been conducted to evaluate the potential promises of the goal-based software architecture.
1.3. Thesis Contribution
This thesis outlines an alternative concept for developing cost-effective and reliable
spacecraft fault protection. The idea is to develop spacecraft fault protection software by
building and combining generic component specifications. The resulting component-based
architecture aims to achieve the goal of cost-effective and reliable fault protection in two ways.
First, fault protection design is integrated into the design of the rest of the spacecraft software.
In so doing, design decisions about fault protection can be taken into account from the beginning
of the spacecraft design phase. Moreover, by integrating fault protection into individual
components, the same engineers working on a particular component or subsystem of the
spacecraft will also be able to specify and design the fault protection related to that component or
subsystem level, thus guaranteeing that fault protection is designed by engineers with first hand
knowledge of that part of the system.
The second advantage of reusable architectural components is the ability to capture
domain knowledge. Given the variety of spacecraft designs, the fundamental design principles of
a spacecraft are and have remained relatively the same. All spacecraft share common
requirements for power, attitude control, communication, etc. Furthermore, the technologies
used to meet these requirements have also remained relatively static, a result of the high cost of
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space missions and the resulting risk-driven designs used to meet these requirements. As an
example, the techniques and technologies used to perform attitude determination have been
confined to a few varieties: inertial based (gyros), celestial vector referenced (sun sensors, star
trackers, earth sensors), or magnetic field referenced (magnetometer). (The recent introduction
of GPS based attitude determination can be regarded as a fundamentally new and unique
technology.)
This is not to say that the techniques and technologies used on spacecraft today are the
same as those used on the first space missions. The field of spacecraft design has certainly
evolved, but the underlying principles have remained the same. Each time a spacecraft is
designed, engineers discover improvements that make the existing techniques more accurate or
more robust. Like most engineering disciplines, spacecraft design is an evolutionary rather than
a revolutionary process.
The knowledge required to design a complex system such as a spacecraft is extensive and
much of it must be gained through experience. There are not many people who have the
expertise to design and build a system that can travel in the harsh and relatively unknown
environment of space, across vast distances measurable by the time traveled by light. The
importance of capturing this expertise becomes ever more essential as the complexity of
spacecraft increases and new engineers replace those who retire.
The primary goal of this research is part of a wider effort to capture, store, and ultimately
reuse domain knowledge intrinsic to spacecraft fault protection and spacecraft design in general.
Past attempts to reuse design have been at the implementation or code level, resulting in some
spectacular losses (the Ariane 501 [6] and Mars Climate Orbiter [3]). This thesis describes a
new method of capturing and reusing spacecraft design, not at the implementation level but at the
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specification level, effectively creating a reusable spacecraft architecture. Specifications and
models of components would be combined by the designers in a plug-and-play environment to
create subsystems and ultimately a spacecraft design. Then changes would be made by the
designers to tailor the component designs to the unique spacecraft requirements and the design
validated using expert review, formal analysis, and simulation. Only after this system design
validation is completed would implementation begin.
1.4. Thesis Outline
The structure of this thesis is divided into three parts: Background, Implementation, and
Discussion. The background chapter is devoted to research concepts. Specifically, component-
based spacecraft architecture, the concept of creating and reusing a generic library of spacecraft
components to build unique spacecraft design specifications is discussed. Intent specifications
and the benefits of using intent specifications to implement the component-based spacecraft
architecture are also detailed in this chapter.
The implementation chapter covers specific details of applying the component-based
spacecraft architecture to actual spacecraft fault protection software. Cassini's
overpressurization fault protection software is used to demonstrate the application of the research
concepts outlined in the background chapter.
The discussion chapter involves an informal comparison of the implementation of fault
protection software using the component-based spacecraft architecture and current spacecraft
fault protection architectures. Lastly, some possible issues and concluding remarks are included
in this section.
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2. Background
2.1. Component-Based System Engineering
The fundamental research concept behind this thesis is reusable component-based system
engineering, which is the process of creating a system from components with pre-specified
interfaces [10]. Unlike component-based software engineering, which seeks to reuse code or
design at the implementation-level, the goal of component-based system engineering is to store
domain knowledge by capturing generic design elements at the specification-level. By reusing
design at the specification-level, the negative effects of code reuse are largely avoided, but the
opportunity to significantly lower development cost still exists.
2.1.1. Generic Component Library
The first step in creating a library of reusable components is to determine how to divide
the system into components. For a spacecraft, the easiest way to accomplish this task is to
decompose the spacecraft design by functions. Most spacecraft can be decomposed into a
number of different subsystems: ADCS, Power, Thermal, Guidance and Navigation (GNC),
Command and Data Handling, Payload, etc. These subsystems each have specific and distinct
functions that are required for any spacecraft. For example, every spacecraft must be able to
properly determine its attitude and provide some means of controlling its orientation. Within
each subsystem, there are a number of specific technologies available to accomplish the
functions of that subsystem. As illustrated in Figure 1, for the ADCS subsystem, these include
IMUs, sun sensors, star trackers, RCSs, and RWAs.
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Figure 1 - Spacecraft Decomposition
2.1.2. Generic and Reusable
The success of any reuse process, whether at the implementation or specification level is
dependent on the reusability of each component in the library. Each component specification
must be easily tailored to fit unique spacecraft designs. To accomplish this, each component
specification must be generic. Generic specifications can be created for groups of specific
spacecraft technologies. As an example, there are primarily only two types of sun sensors
currently available: analog or digital [9]. Functionally, all digital sun sensors work in the same
manner and therefore, a generic specification of a digital sun sensor can be created that can be
easily tailored to any digital sun sensor model. Details specific to a particular digital sun sensor
such as the number of gray code bits used are highlighted in the generic specification document
so that system engineers may easily identify and make appropriate changes during the actual
design of the spacecraft.
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2.1.3. Integrated Fault Protection
Each generic component specification describes the component's hardware and software.
Each component specification also includes generic fault protection features such as redundancy
management. By specifying basic fault protection features for each generic component and
building a complete spacecraft specification from these components, fault protection is included
in the design of the spacecraft from the very beginning. Instead of being a separate entity that
cannot be completed until a final spacecraft design has been completed, fault protection becomes
an integral part of the general spacecraft design process. The design requirements for fault
protection can be used to drive design decisions from the beginning of the spacecraft design
process. In addition, the engineers designing a particular component or subsystem will be
responsible for designing the fault protection at that component or subsystem level, thus
guaranteeing that fault protection is designed by engineers with first hand knowledge of that part
of the system.
2.1.4. Domain-Specific Specifications
The reusable component library must be domain-specific to spacecraft engineering.
There are primarily two reasons for restricting the component library to a specific domain. First,
the main motivation of this research is to capture domain knowledge. The best way to capture
domain knowledge is to have domain experts working on the design of actual spacecraft be in
charge of creating and updating the reusable library. Like any engineering discipline, much of
the knowledge required to design the system is gained through experience. The best way to
ensure that this knowledge is captured properly is to provide a method by which those with direct
first-hand knowledge of the system can capture and store the rationales, assumptions, and
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constraints involved with the design of the system. In Section 2.2, a specification methodology
that supports domain knowledge capture will be introduced.
To test the concept of a component-based spacecraft architecture with reusable
specifications, a small library of reusable, generic spacecraft component specifications has been
created. These components include the ones shown in Figure 1. A generic ADCS subsystem
specification has also been created. In the next chapter, a generic Pressure Regulation System
(PRS) and an ADCS specification are modified and combined to form Cassini's
overpressurization fault protection software to prove the applicability of the component-based
spacecraft architecture.
2.2. Intent Specifications
The success of a reusable specification architecture (and indeed any extensive reuse)
depends on capturing the design rationale and assumptions upon which the reusable component
designs rest. This goal is accomplished by using intent specifications [5]. While the concept of
reusable specification is not specific to a particular specification methodology, there are many
benefits to creating the reusable library using intent specifications. Intent specifications were
designed to aid engineers in managing requirements, design, and evolution of complex systems
and a toolset exists to support the methodology.
The features of intent specifications and the toolset (called SpecTRM) that are the most
important in the context of this thesis are:
e Intent specifications enforce good documentation practices, and they provide a means to
specify and easily link requirements, design rationales, and design assumptions. The
links support traceability and the ability to find the places that need to be changed when
instantiating the generic specifications.
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* Intent specifications were designed to facilitate communication between people from
various disciplines. An intent specification is meant to be readable by engineers,
managers, operators, maintainers, and anyone who is working on the project. Cognitive
engineering and systems theory research were used to insure that the methodology and
toolset can be picked up and used with ease. No formal training is required to read and
create intent specifications.
* SpecTRM integrates the results of hazard analysis and other safety-related information
into the engineering specifications, which aids in the design of fault protection
mechanisms to mitigate the identified hazards.
* Intent specifications and SpecTRM include a formal modeling language called
SpecTRM-RL, which allows users to formally model the blackbox behavior of the
system. Having a formal model of the system allows for mathematical analyses and
simulation of the system behavior before any costly code is implemented.
2.2.1. Human-Centered Specifications
Intent specifications is a specification methodology developed by Dr. Nancy Leveson and
her students to assist engineers with the design and evolution of complex systems. Based on
systems engineering principles, the methodology is designed from a human-centered perspective.
The idea is that software and systems in general are human products, and specifications are tools
that allow people to communicate ideas and solve problems. By building a specification
methodology based on the way humans naturally perceive and tackle problems; typical
engineering processes such as requirements capture, design, review and verification,
maintenance, and evolution can be greatly enhanced [5].
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2.2.2. Intent Specification Structure
Environment Operator
System and
Components
Figure 2 - Intent Specification Abstraction
Intent specification is structured into seven levels as shown in
specification methodologies, each level of intent specification does not
V&V
Figure 2. Unlike most
represent refinement of
the system but rather views of the same system from different perspectives, shown in the vertical
dimension. Levels 0, 1, 2, and 3 of intent specifications include the information generated
during system design. Levels 4, 5, and 6 involve details carried out at implementation and
during operation of the system.
The horizontal dimension is divided into four parts. The first column depicts information
about the system's environment. The second column contains information related to human
operators such as human factor design. The third column represents information regarding the
system itself, and the fourth column integrates the verification and validation processes involved
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Level 0 Project management plans, status information, safety plans, etc.
Level 1 Assumptions Responsibilities System Goals,
Sysem onsraits equremnts High-level Requirements, HazardSystem Constraints Requirements Design Constraints, Analysis
Purpose I/F RequirementsLitaon Limitations
Level2 External Task Analyses Logic Principles, Control Validation
System Interfaces Task Allocation Laws, Functional Plans and
Principles Controls, displays Decomposition and ResultsAllocation
Level 3 Analysis
Blackbox Environment Operator Task Blackbox Functional Plans and
Models Models and HCI Models Models, Interface Specs Results
Level 4 HCI Design Software and Hardware Test Plans
Design Rep. Design Specs and Results
Level 5
Physical GUI and Physical Software Code, Hardware Test Plans
Rep. Controls Designs Assembly Instructions and ResultsRpCoerors Manuals Pefomac
Level 6 Audit Operator Manuals Error Reports, Change Performance
Operations Procedures Maintainance Requests, etc. Montitoring
_______ _________Training Materials Reuss t. and Audits
at each level. The structure of intent specification is designed with the purpose of capturing
intent. Information at every level and column can be linked to form a specification, which
answers "Why" in addition to "What" and "How". While Figure 2 provides a good graphical
depiction of an intent specification, a specification document is linear. The translation of Figure
2 into a linear document requires nesting subsections. Figure 3 shows how an intent
specification document is typically organized for Levels 0-3.
Each generic spacecraft component specification was captured in an intent specification
from Level 0 to Level 3. Levels 4-6 were beyond the scope of this thesis since they involve
specific implementation details. In the next chapter, the intent specification of a Pressure
Regulation System and its associated overpressurization fault protection are analyzed in detail.
A copy of the actual intent specification can also be found in the appendix.
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1. Level 0 - Program Management Plans
a. Program Management Plans
b. System Safety Plans
2. Level 1 - System Level Goals, Requirements, and Constraints
a. Introduction
b. Historical Information
c. Environment Description
d. Environment Assumptions
e. Environment Constraints
f. System Functional Goals
g. High-Level Requirements
h. Design and Safety Constraints
i. Operator Requirements
j. System Interface Requirements
k. System Limitations
1. Hazard List and Hazard Log
m. Hazard Analysis
n. Verification and Validation
3. Level 2 - System Design Principles
a. System Interface Design
b. Controls and Displays
c. Operator Task Design Principles
d. System Design Principles
e. Verification and Validation
4. Level 3 - Blackbox Behavior
a. Behavioral Assumptions and Models of the Environment
b. Communication
c. User Model
d. System Blackbox Behavior
e. Verification and Validation
Figure 3 - Intent Specification Organization
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3. Implementation
3.1. Cassini Pressure Regulation System Overview
To investigate the feasibility of component-based specification reuse of fault protection
design, a generic Pressure Regulation System (PRS) specification was modified and combined
with a generic ADCS subsystem specification to create a Cassini-like PRS fault protection
specification [4].
The generic PRS specification is based on a design common to bipropellant propulsion
systems [1]. The system includes three tanks, one for the pressurizing gas, which is Helium in
this case, and two for the propellants (oxidizer and fuel). Besides the tanks, all other components
of the PRS are dual redundant. Passive pressure regulators regulate the flow of Helium into each
propellant tank. Latch valves and pyrotechnic valves are designed to allow the system to
reconfigure to a redundant branch should the primary branch fail. The generic PRS specification
has one dual-string pressure transducer for each propellant tank. Cassini's PRS includes an extra
pressure transducer on the fuel tank. A block diagram of our simplified implementation of
Cassini's PRS is shown in Figure 4.
The generic PRS specification is linked to a generic ADCS subsystem specification. The
ADCS specification includes requirements and design principles associated with a typical ADCS
subsystem. The ADCS specification is linked to other components specific to a particular
spacecraft design such as Cassini. The interface between the PRS and ADCS are described in
sections 3.3.10 and 3.4.1.
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Section 3 Section 4 Z Latch Valve
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Oxidizer Fuel C Pyro Valve,
Tank Tank Normally Closed
rZ Pressure Regulator
Pressure Transducer
Figure 4 - Cassini PRS Block Diagram
Cassini's fault protection software is a traditional monitor and response algorithm. The
PRS fault protection algorithms monitor telemetry from pressure transducers on each propellant
tank and declare an overpressurization event if the telemetry exceeds predefined limits.
Following the detection of an overpressurization event, the algorithm invokes a response, which
sends predetermined commands to latch valves and pyrotechnic valves to cut off the flow of
Helium into the propellant tanks.
There are two separate monitors and responses for the PRS. The design of each monitor
is the same except for different overpressure limits. Each monitor checks the inputs from all
three pressure transducers and declares an overpressurization event if two out of three pressure
transducers are above the pressure limit.
Both responses are designed to cut off the flow of Helium through the prime regulator.
The first response attempts to stem the flow through the prime regulator by closing the primary
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latch valve. The second response is designed to further isolate the prime regulator should the
first response fail to stop the overpressurization event. The failure of the first response can result
from the failure to command the latch valve or a failure of the latch valve itself. The second
response initiates and engages pyrotechnic valves between the Helium tank and the prime
regulator, permanently shutting the flow through the primary regulator.
Cassini's overpressurization fault protection algorithms are part of the larger spacecraft-
wide fault protection software. In addition to other subsystem-specific fault protection
algorithms, the software contains responses for system-level faults or faults that affect the
operation of the entire spacecraft such as loss of attitude. The scope of this thesis is limited to
the discussion of the component-level and subsystem-level fault protection.
3.2. Level 0 - PRS Intent Specification
Level 0 of intent specifications represents the system from the program management
perspective. Information at this level includes organization-specific details such as program
management plans and system safety policies. Level 0 is not specified for the PRS or any other
generic spacecraft component specification. This level is dependent on specific organizational
policies. The program management plans and safety policies of JPL, for example, might be very
different from those at NASA Goddard or Boeing. The content and responsibility of completing
Level 0 is best decided by individual organizations.
3.3. Level 1 - PRS Intent Specification
Level 1 is designed to provide users with a high-level conceptual view of the system.
Level 1 can be described as the customer's view of the system. At this level, system goals are
defined for each column depicted in Figure 2. Goals are very general statements of what the
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system should do. Refinement at this level involves taking functional goals and determining
testable high-level requirements, system and environmental constraints, assumptions, and
limitations. Also included in Level 1 are analyses on system properties such as the preliminary
and system-level hazard analyses. Following the outline shown in Figure 3, the implementation
of Level 1 for the PRS specification is now described in detail:
3.3.1. Introduction
The introduction is designed to give readers a broad picture of the system being described
in the specification document. The introduction for the PRS is stated as follows: *
The Pressure Regulation System (PRS) is a part of the propulsion subsystem. Its function is to
regulate the pressure of the oxidizer and fuel tank onboard the spacecraft. The pressure regulation
system consists of several components. They are the Helium tank, the propellant tanks (oxidizer,
and fuel tank), latch valves, pyrotechnic valves, passive pressure regulators, pressure transducers,
and associated piping. There are many possible designs associated with a given pressure
regulation system. The following specification is based on a design common to bipropellant
propulsion systems.
The PRS has a software controller, which controls all active components of the PRS. The active
components include each latch valve, pyrotechnic valve, and pressure transducer. The tanks,
pressure regulators, and piping are purely mechanical devices and cannot be actively controlled
during the spacecraft's operation.
For purposes of identification, the latch valves and pyrotechnic valves of the PRS are divided into 4
sections, as depicted in Figure 1. Each section has two separate branches. The latch valve or
pyrotechnic valve is named according to the section and branch that it resides.
Section 1, for example, contains two latch valves and two pyrotechnic valves. The components on
the left branch are labeled A and the components on the right branch are labeled B. For example,
the latch valve on the left side of Section 1 is referred to as Latch Valve 1A.
Excerpts from the actual specification documents are indented and formatted in Arial font.
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Figure 1
3.3.2. Historical Information
The historical information section of Level 1 provides information regarding previous or
similar systems to assist readers in understanding the relation of the system being described to
historical systems. The component-based spacecraft architecture described in this thesis and
similar architectures such as MDS is included here. An excerpt from the PRS historical
information section includes the following:
This specification is based on the SpecTRM-GSC spacecraft component specification architecture.
SpecTRM-GSC is a component based specification language designed specifically for the domain
of spacecraft engineering.
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3.3.3. Environment Description
The environment description section of Level 1 describes information about the
environment in which the system is expected to operate. The PRS environmental description is
given below:
The PRS is only one component in a complex spacecraft environment. The PRS is part of the
Propulsion Subsystem. Its function is to regulate the pressure within the oxidizer and fuel tanks.
The oxidizer and fuel tanks contain propellants used for delta V maneuvers and attitude control of
the spacecraft. As a result, the function of the PRS has a direct effect on the Attitude
Determination and Control Subsystem (ADCS) of the spacecraft and interacts directly with the
ADCS subsystem controller. The PRS will receive commands from the ADCS and alert the ADCS
when reconfiguration or safing is needed.
Like every component on the spacecraft, the PRS is expected to operate in the harsh environment
of space. All components are expected to operate nominally in complete vacuum. Depending on
the phase of the mission, the spacecraft will also experience a wide range of temperatures. All
components are required to meet the mission survivable temperatures limits.
Note: Refer to the Thermal Subsystem Specification for information regarding spacecraft thermal
design.
Notes, rationales, and assumptions are documented whenever possible. These comments,
shown in italics, are vital for capturing intent. They provide readers of the specification with a
better understanding of the system by answering the "whys" in addition to "what" and "how."
3.3.4. Environment Assumptions
Assumptions about system in which the system will operate are documented in Level 1.
The correct operation of the system and the hazard analyses will be dependent on these
assumptions. The PRS has one environmental assumptions stated below:
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[EA.1] Ground commands can only be received when the spacecraft is in direct sight of the Deep
Space Network. There will also be a time lag between the time the signal is sent and when it is
received. [-+OR.11 [-+OR.21
Rationale: The spacecraft is not always in direct contact with Earth. At various times in the
mission, the spacecraft will be traveling behind celestial bodies. Also, given the distance between
Earth and the spacecraft, the command signals will take some time to reach and arrive from the
spacecraft.
3.3.5. Environment Constraints
Environment constraints are constraints placed on the environment to ensure the proper
function of the system.
[EC.1] Components from other parts of the spacecraft must not physically interfere with the
function of the PRS.
3.3.6. System Functional Goals
System functional goals are usually developed in the early stages of the project and stated
in very general terms. They are statements that provide a broad overview of what the system is
to achieve. The functional goal of the PRS is stated as follows:
[FG.1] The PRS shall regulate the pressure of the oxidizer and fuel tanks to a specified pressure
range. [-+FR.11
3.3.7. High-Level Requirements
One of the first steps during the development of any system is to come up with high-level
requirements that will achieve the system functional goals. High-level requirements must be
written in a form that is testable. For the PRS, the high-level requirements are stated as follows:
[FR. 1] The PRS shall pressurize the oxidizer and fuel tanks by releasing Helium, which is stored at
a higher pressure into the oxidizer and fuel tanks. k-FG.11
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Note: Since the Helium tank is connected to the oxidizer and fuel tanks, Helium will flow into the
oxidizer and fuel tanks until the pressures in all three tanks are equalized unless there is pressure
regulator in between the tanks.
Note: Pressure is a function of temperature. The pressure of the oxidizer and fuel tank will vary as
their contents are expelled (endothermic chemical reaction). The temperature of the tank will also
vary depending on the position of the spacecraft in relation to the sun. Heaters provide active
control of the tank temperature. See Thermal Subsystem Specification. [4DP.6.1]
FR. 1 is a requirement, which achieves the goal FG. 1. FR. 1 is linked to the functional
goal FG. 1 as well as design principles in Level 2 of the intent specification document. Design
principles in Level 2 state how the requirement will be satisfied. Adding hyperlinks such as the
ones shown above form links between various sections in the specification document. SpecTRM
provides a user-friendly interface to create and modify links as required. Up and down arrows
are used to show links that are formed between two different levels while forward and backward
arrows point to sections within the same level.
[FR.2] The PRS shall prevent an overpressurization of the oxidizer and fuel tanks. [->HL.11
[FR.2.1] The PRS shall detect an overpressurization event in the oxidizer and fuel tank by
checking the pressures in the oxidizer and fuel tanks. [4DP.6]
Assumption: The pressure transducers are calibrated and provide accurate information
on their associated tank pressures.
Note: Pressure readings are in pounds per square inch absolute (psia).
[FR.2.2] The PRS shall take appropriate action to stem an overpressurization event with
automated responses.
[FR.2.2.1] Upon detecting an overpressurization event, the PRS will first attempt
to stem the flow of Helium into the oxidizer and fuel tanks by closing the primary
latch valve (Latch Valve 1A) within 16 seconds of detecting the
overpressurization event. [4DP.71
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[FR.2.2.2] If the pressure of the oxidizer and fuel tank continue to rise, the PRS
shall command the appropriate pyrotechnic valve to engage and stop the flow of
Helium within 120 seconds. [4DP.81
Note: The pyrotechnic valve cannot be reset. Once it is engaged, the valve will
be closed for the remainder of the spacecraft's lifetime. Ground controllers must
reconfigure the PRS to use the secondary branch in the event that the primary
pyrotechnic valve is fired. [-+SC.41
[FR.3] The automated overpressurization fault responses shall be enabled and disabled by ground
controllers or higher-level spacecraft commands. [4DP.51
Note: Higher-level spacecraft commands may be issued from subsystem controllers during various
phases in the mission.
Refinements are performed within each section by nesting subsections as illustrated in
FR.2.
3.3.8. Design and Safety Constraints
The design and safety constraints section is divided into non-safety related constraints
and safety constraints. Constraints restrict how the system may achieve its goals. The PRS
specification has four safety-related constraints.
[SC.1] The first overpressurization response must be executed within 16 seconds of reaching the
Stage-1 overpressurization limit of 269 psia.
[SC.2] The second overpressurization response must be executed within 120 seconds of reaching
the Stage-2 overpressurization limit of 380 psia.
[SC.3] The first overpressurization response must be executed before the pressure has reached
the second response limit.
Rationale: The two overpressurization responses are not designed to execute in parallel with each
other.
[SC.4] The pyrotechnic valves must not be engaged inadvertently. [-+HL.21 [<-FR.2.2.21
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Rationale: Pyrotechnic valves can only be engaged once. Once the valve has been engaged, it
can never be returned to the previous position.
3.3.9. Operator Requirements
Operator requirements are stated to aid in the design of the human-computer interface,
system logic, operator procedures, operator documentation, and training plans. The operator
requirements captured for the PRS includes the following:
[OR.1] Ground controllers will monitor all telemetry from the spacecraft including telemetry specific
to the PRS such as the position of each valve and the pressures of the oxidizer and fuel tanks.
k-EA.11
[OR.2] If an overpressurization response is carried out, ground controllers will reconfigure the PRS
to redundant branches by commanding the appropriate latch valves and pyrotechnic valves.
[+-EA.11
Note: The automated overpressurization responses are designed to shut off the flow of Helium into
the oxidizer and fuel tanks, which prevents the regulation of pressure in the oxidizer and fuel tanks.
3.3.10.System Interface Requirements
System interface requirements documents the human-computer interface such as controls,
displays, and aural alerts.
[SIR.1] The ground controller will enable and disable automated fault protection at any time by
sending a command to the spacecraft. [4CNTRL11
Assumption: There is a communication link between the spacecraft and the ground.
[SIR.2] The ground controller will manually command any active components of the PRS by
sending individual commands to the spacecraft. l4CNTRL.11
Assumption: The automation must be disabled for manual commands.
[SIR.3] The ground controller will be able to view all PRS related telemetry. LDISP.11 [dDISP.21
[fDISP.3 [4SI.1.51
Assumption: There is a communication link between the spacecraft and the ground.
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3.3.11.System Limitations
System limitations describe functional limitations. They may be related to basic
functional requirements such as the following:
[SL.1] Pressurization of the oxidizer and fuel tanks will be limited to the amount of Helium stored.
Once the pressure of the Helium tank has equalized with the oxidizer and fuel tanks, pressurization
will cease.
3.3.12.Hazard List
The hazard list contains all relevant hazards of the system. The hazard list is an essential
part of the system design, including the design of the fault protection. Fault prevention
techniques and fault protection mechanisms may be designed by identifying hazards and
performing a hazard analysis.
[HL.1] The oxidizer tank and fuel tank pressure is over 269 psia. [<-FR.21
Rationale: Overpressurization of either tank will lead to catastrophic failure of the tanks, causing
possible rupture and eventual explosion. Any explosion onboard the spacecraft will result in the
failure of the entire spacecraft.
[HL.2] Pyrotechnic valves are fired inadvertently. [+-SC.4
Rationale: The pyrotechnic valve should only be engaged, either automatically by the fault
protection software, or manually by ground controllers, when there are no other mechanisms
available to stem an overpressurization event.
3.3.13.Hazard Analysis
Hazard analyses are vital for almost any safety-critical system. In intent specifications,
the hazard analysis is integrated to the specification process, from the very start. Hazard
analyses play an important role in the development of fault protection because fault protection is
inherently a safety feature of the system. Various fault protection mechanisms, including
30
hardware and software design as well as fault prevention mechanisms, can be driven by the
results of the hazard analysis.
There are various methods of hazard analyses available. A basic fault tree analysis is
included for the hazard HL. 1 identified in the hazard list.
3.3.14.Verification and Validation
At level 1, the verification and validation requirements list out the various review
procedures required for the system design. Participants and the results of the review procedures
are also recorded.
Review Procedures
The PRS will involve several formal reviews. Each review will be performed at different stages in
the design process. A brief description of each review will be described below:
31
Requirements Review - The requirements review will take place prior the initial design phase. The
review is designed to ensure that all customer requirements are set and understood by both
parties.
Formal Design Review - The formal design review will incorporate all aspects of the PRS design. It
will take place after the initial design is complete. The formal design review will be focused on the
design principles of the PRS. The review will encompass the design project in terms of structural,
electromechanical, software, and safety aspects.
Operations Review -The operations review will take place after the PRS has been completed. The
operations review is designed to focus discussion on the operations of the PRS with particular
attention to ground controller training and procedural requirements.
Participants
Requirements Review -System Engineer, Customer Representative
Formal Design Review - System Engineer, Subsystem Engineers, Safety Engineer, Ground
Controller, Outside Reviewer
Operations Review - System Engineer, Safety Engineer, Ground Controller
3.4. Level 2 - PRS Intent Specification
Level 2 of intent specifications contain the system design principles and engineering
principles required to satisfy the requirements and constraints at Level 1. Similarly, Level 2
answers the questions "why" for the level below. Information at this level is informal, written
normally in the form of English in addition to any applicable mathematical equations. For the
PRS fault protection algorithms, Level 2 describes the design of the monitor and response
algorithms of the fault protection software.
3.4.1. System Interface Design
To properly specify the interaction of the system with its environment, the interfaces
between the system and each external component must be specified. This information is
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included in this section. For the PRS, the interface design describes the input and output
information between the PRS controller and the ADCS controller:
[Si] PRS-ADCS Interface
[SI.1.1] The PRS receives an input command from the ADCS controller to enable or
disable the automated fault protection software.
[SI.1.2] The PRS receives manual commands from ground controllers via the ADCS
controller. Manual commands will include commands for all active components in the
PRS.
[SI.1.2.1] There are two possible manual commands for each latch valve: Open
and Close.
[SI.1.2.2] There are three possible manual commands for each pyrotechnic
valve: Enable, Disable, and Fire.
[SI.1.2.3] Only one manual command is received and executed once every
second.
[SI.1.3] The PRS sends the ADCS controller an output message indicating its current
control mode. This output is updated once every second. [LLevel 3 Control Model
[SI.1.4] When the automated fault protection software has detected an overpressurization
event, the PRS sends the ADCS an output message indicating that the system needs to
be reconfigured. Automated responses are carried out when a message from the ADCS
is received. [->DP.7.11 [->DP.7.21 [-*DP.8.11 [->DP.8.21
Rationale: Before carrying out reconfiguration commands, eg. Closing latch valves and
pyrotechnic valves, the spacecraft must be in a safe state and there must be adequate
power and other spacecraft resources. The PRS controller derives this information from
the ADCS controller.
[SI.1.5] PRS telemetry is sent to ground controllers through the ADCS controller. [TSIR.3]
[SI.1.5.1] An output message is sent to the ADCS controller once every second
indicating the position of each latch valve: Open or Close
[SI.1.5.2] An output message is sent to the ADCS controller once every second
indicating the position of each pyrotechnic valve: Open or Close
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[SI.1.5.3] An output message is sent to the ADCS controller once every second
indicating the state of each pyrotechnic valve: Normal, Enabled, or Fired.
[SI.1.5.4] An output message is sent to the ADCS controller once every second
indicating the pressure reading from each pressure transducer.
Note: Each pressure transducer is dual string. There are a total of six pressure
readings from the three pressure transducers.
3.4.2. Controls and Displays
The controls and displays section of Level 2 includes information specific to the design
of human-computer interface. Information in this section will be in the form of design
specification for the ground controller computer interface.
[CTRL.1] Each PRS command has a unique identifier. Ground controllers use a command line
interface to send all commands to the PRS controller. Commands are typed in via a keyboard.
[DISP.1] Each PRS telemetry point is displayed on a monitor. Telemetry is updated once every
second when there is direct contact with the spacecraft. [tsIR.31
[DISP.2] Pressure readings are highlighted in the following scheme: [T SIR.31
In green when the reading is between 200-269psia.
In yellow when the reading is between 270-300psia.
In red when the reading is between 301-400psia.
[DISP.3] The state of pyrotechnic valves are highlighted in the following scheme: [TSIR.31
In green when Normal.
In yellow when Enabled.
In red when Fired.
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3.4.3. Operator Task Design Principles
The operator's expected tasks are documented in the operator task design principles
section of Level 2. For the PRS, this includes tasks specific to the manual operation of the PRS.
These tasks include the following:
[ODP.1] Ground controllers are required to enable PRS fault protection following spacecraft launch
and checkout. PRS fault protection should remain enabled through the cruise phase of the
mission.
[ODP.2] Ground controllers are required to ensure that PRS fault protection is disabled before the
spacecraft enters orbit insertion mode.
Note: PRS fault protection is automatically disabled by the ADCS controller prior to orbit insertion,
but ground controllers must ensure that it has been disabled.
3.4.4. System Design Principles
The system design principles section describes the basic principles or assumptions upon
which the system design depends. System design principles are linked to functional goals and
high-level requirements, constraints, limitations, hazard analysis as well as to lower level system
design and implementation. Design rationales and assumptions must be captured whenever
possible to provide readers with the design intent. The PRS fault protection design principles are
represented in this section. Also captured here are the design principles related to the operation
of the latch valves, pyrotechnic valves, and pressure transducers.
[DP.1] Latch Valve Design Principle
[DP.1.1] Each latch valve has a sensor that reports its current position once every second:
Open or Close. [4Level 3 Latch Valve Inputs]
[DP.1.2] There are two possible commands for each latch valve: Open and Close.
[DP.1.2.1] An Open Latch Valve command is issued to open the latch valve. A
response is expected within 5 seconds after the command is sent. If a response
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is not recorded after 5 seconds, the latch valve is declared as Stuck Closed.
[4Level 3 Latch Valve Open Outputsl [Level 3 Latch Valve Status]
[DP.1.2.2] A Close Latch Valve command is issued to close the latch valve. A
response is expected within 5 seconds after the command is sent. If a response
is not recorded after 5 seconds, the latch valve is declared as Stuck Opened.
[4Level 3 Latch Valve Close Outputs1 [4Level 3 Latch Valve Statusi
[DP.2] Pyrotechnic Valve Design Principle
[DP.2.1] Each pyrotechnic valve has a sensor that reports its current position once every
second: Open or Close. [4Level 3 Pyrotechnic Valve Inputs
[DP.2.2] Each pyrotechnic valve only has one commandable state but requires two
separate commands to engage the pyrotechnic mechanism. To fire a pyrotechnic valve,
an Enable command must first be sent to enable the pyrotechnic mechanism. This
command arms the pyrotechnic device. Following a 90 second delay (required by the
pyrotechnic bank to charge), a second command to fire the pyrotechnic device is sent to
open or close the valve permanently. A Disable command can be sent to disable the
arming mechanism and return the pyrotechnic valve to a normal state. 4Level 3
Pyrotechnic Valve Outputs]
[DP.2.3] The state of each pyrotechnic valve is inferred from commands sent. The state
of the pyrotechnic valve becomes Enabled following an Enable command. If a Disable
command is sent, the state returns to Normal. However, if a Fire command is sent after
the Enable command, the state of the pyrotechnic valve enters Fired. It remains in this
state for the rest of the spacecrafts operational period. [4Level 3 Pyrotechnic Valve
Status
[DP.3] Pressure Transducer Design Principles
[DP.3.1] The PRS receives 2 inputs from each pressure transducer. The inputs contain
information about the current pressure reading of each pressure transducer. The
expected range of values is between 200-400 psia. Any input value outside of this range
is deemed obsolete. The expected update rate of these inputs are once every second
and are deemed obsolete after 5 seconds. [tFR.11 [-DP.6.11 [4Level 3 Pressure
Transducer Inputs
[DP.4] Fault Protection Design Principles Overview
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The automated overpressurization fault response is an essential feature of the PRS. The purpose
of the overpressurization fault protection software is to protect against an overpressurization of the
propellant tanks due to a regulator leak [Hazard Analysis]. The overpressurization fault protection
software includes two separate fault detection mechanisms and two different fault responses.
Stage 1 Overpressurization Detection and Response Overview: The Stage 1 overpressurization
fault protection algorithm declares an overpressurization event when two of the three pressure
transducers exceed the Stage 1 qualification pressure limit of 269 psia. The response is designed
to close the primary latch valve (Latch Valve 1A) before the pressure has reached the Stage 2
qualification pressure limit of 380 psia.
Stage 2 Overpressurization Detection and Response Overview: The Stage 2 overpressurization
fault protection algorithm declares an overpressurization event when two of the three pressures
transducers exceed the Stage 2 qualification pressure limit of 380 psia. The response is designed
to isolate the prime regulator from the helium tank. This is carried out by engaging the prime
pyrotechnic valve (Pyrotechnic Valve 2A) and completely shut off the flow of Helium through the
prime regulator.
The enable and disable strategy for the fault protection software is a vital component of
the fault protection design. At certain times during the spacecraft mission, it may be necessary to
disable the fault protection software to prevent inadvertent system responses from occurring. As
an example, during Cassini's orbit insertion, commands not related to spacecraft orbit insertion
are de-prioritized until orbit insertion is complete. Without disabling the PRS fault protection, a
response, even if a real fault were present, could jeopardize the entire mission by interfering with
vital orbit insertion procedures. The fault protection enable/disable strategy design principles is
described below:
[DP.5] Fault Protection Enable/Disable Strategy:
[TFR.31 [1Stage 1 Overpressurization Control Model [tStaqe 2 Overpressurization Control Model
[DP.5.1] Both automated Stage 1 and Stage 2 overpressurization fault protection
algorithms are enabled by default. They may be separately enabled or disabled via
ground commanding or higher-level autonomous spacecraft commanding via the ADCS.
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Note: An example of a higher-level autonomous spacecraft command to disable
automated PRS fault protection occurs during orbit insertion when automated fault
protection is turned off to prevent the automation from interfering with more critical
commands.
[DP.5.2] Both fault protection algorithms are disabled following a response. For the Stage
1 Overpressurization algorithm, this occurs after the prime latch valve has been closed.
For the Stage 2 Overpressurization algorithm, this occurs after the prime pyrotechnic
valve has been enabled and fired.
Note: Ground controllers may re-enable Stage 1 and Stage 2 Overpressurization fault
protection, but the effects of this procedure is not known.
Note: Both fault protection algorithms are disabled after the last response command is
sent, eg, for Stage I response, LatchValve IA Close, and for Stage 2, PyroValve2AFire.
This does not guarantee that the response has been successful. For example, the latch
valve might have failed and sending a command to close the latch valve won't have any
effect on the system.
As stated, the PRS fault protection software has two separate detection and response
algorithms. The design of the two fault detection algorithms is the same except for different
fault limits corresponding to Stage 1 and Stage 2 overpressurization limits. The detection
algorithm design is described in the following design principles:
[DP.6] Stage 1 and Stage 2 Overpressurization Detection Design [TFR.2.11
[DP.6.1] Both Stage 1 and Stage 2 Overpressurization fault protection algorithms use
pressure readings from the pressure transducer on the oxidizer tank and both pressure
transducers on the fuel tank. [<-DP.31 [4Level 3 Overpressurization Fault Status]
Note: Two pressure transducers from the fuel tank are used because the fuel tank is less
susceptible than the oxidizer tank to pressure changes from thermal conditions. [iFR.11
Note: All three pressure transducers may be powered by the same power source
onboard the spacecraft. Appropriate fault prevention design of the power system must be
carried out to prevent a single-point failure of all three pressure transducers. See Power
Subsystem Specification.
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[DP.6.2] Both Stage 1 and Stage 2 Overpressurization fault protection algorithms first
determines if a pressure transducer input is valid by checking the following conditions:
1) The input is within the range of 200-400 psia
2) The input was received less than 5 seconds ago
[DP.6.3] The Stage 1 Overpressurization fault protection algorithm declares an
overpressurization event for a pressure transducer if either input is above the Stage 1
qualification limit. The Stage 2 Overpressurization fault protection algorithm declares an
overpressurization event for a pressure transducer only if both inputs are above the Stage
2 qualification limit. When only one input is valid, both algorithms use that input to
determine overpressurization. When neither input is valid, neither algorithms indicate
overpressurization for the pressure transducer.
Rationale: The differences in the algorithm logic bias the Stage I algorithm away from a
false negative (failure to correctly respond to an overpressure) and the Stage 2 algorithm
away from a false positive (indication of an overpressure when there is none). This
design provides robustness in multiple-fault scenarios without increasing the risk of
irreversible actions.
[DP.6.4] Both Stage 1 and Stage 2 Overpressurization fault protection algorithms declares
an overpressurization event if two out of the three pressure transducers indicate an
overpressure condition persistently for 5 seconds.
Rationale: The two out of three comparison prevents either an inadvertent response trip
or a failure to detect an overpressure if there is a faulty pressure transducer. It also
prevents an inadvertent response trip due to a thermally induced pressure condition in the
oxidizer tank.
Rationale: The persistence condition prevents a transient condition from initiating the
response.
The design principles of each fault response is described as follows:
[DP.7] Stage I Overpressurization Response Design [TFR.2.2.11
[DP.7.1] Upon declaring a Stage 1 overpressurization event, the Stage 1
Overpressurization algorithm sends a message to the ADCS requesting reconfiguration.
[<-SI.1.41 [4Level 3 Overpressurization Fault Response]
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Rationale: The ADCS is required to stop any attitude maneuvers before the PRS can be
reconfigured. Additionally, the spacecraft may need to power off non-essential
components to allow enough power for the fault protection response.
[DP.7.2] Upon receiving a "response ready" message from the ADCS, the Stage 1
Overpressurization algorithm closes the prime latch valve (Latch Valve 1A). [+-SI.1.41
[DP.8] Stage 2 Overpressurization Response Design [TFR.2.2.21
[DP.8.1] Upon declaring a Stage 2 overpressurization event, the Stage 2
Overpressurization algorithm sends an output to the ADCS requesting reconfiguration.
k-SI.1.41 4L-evel 3 Overpressurization Fault Responsel
Rationale: The ADCS is required to stop any attitude maneuvers before the PRS can be
reconfigured. Additionally, the spacecraft may need to power off non-essential
components to allow enough power for the fault protection response.
[DP.8.2] Upon receiving a "response ready" message from the ADCS, the Stage 2
Overpressurization algorithm sends an output to enable the prime regulator pyrotechnic
valve (Pyrotechnic Valve 2A). [+-SI.1.41
[DP.8.3] 90 seconds after the enable command is sent, the response sends an output to
fire the prime regulator pyrotechnic valve (Pyrotechnic Valve 2A).
Note: This command permanently closes the pyrotechnic valve.
3.5. Level 3 - PRS Intent Specification
The third level of an intent specification is a formal blackbox model of the specification.
This model represents the externally observable behavior of the system being designed. The
modeling language used is called SpecTRM-RL [5]. It is based on an underlying state machine
but uses visualizations and notations that are designed to be easily readable and understood by
engineers and anyone else who may have to contribute to the specification. The formal blackbox
model of the PRS specification is described in this section with details of the modeling language
as required to explain the model. For a more thorough description of the SpecTRM-RL
modeling language, see the SpecTRM User Manual [8].
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3.5.1. Formal Blackbox Model
The SpecTRM-RL modeling language is made up of several components:
" Inputs describe data coming into the system. All inputs have timing constraints to
handle obsolescence.
" Outputs describe data leaving the system. Outputs also support timing constraints.
" Modes represent control modes or supervisory modes controlling the system.
" State Variables represent the states that can be inferred from the relationship
between inputs and outputs of the system. State variables are enumerated values
modeled to represent discrete transitions in the system.
* Macros are Boolean expressions abstracted out to simplify transition table logic.
* Functions calculate outputs and intermediate values.
" Devices are external to the system. They are sources of inputs and sinks of outputs.
Devices represent boundary points of the system.
" Messages are used to convey information about the values of inputs and outputs.
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Figure 5 - PRS Blackbox Model
Using these SpecTRM-RL components, the blackbox behavior of the PRS software
controller was modeled. The representation of the model is shown in Figure 5. The large gray
box represents the PRS controller. The smaller boxes to the right are devices controlled by the
PRS controller. These devices include the latch valves, pyrotechnic valves, and pressure
transducers. The ADCS controller, shown on the left, controls the PRS. Control modes and state
variables are shown within the system boundary. Supervisory modes are differentiated from
other control modes to prevent mode confusion errors.
Logical expression in SpecTRM-RL are captured using a tabular notation known as an
AND/OR table. An example of an AND/OR table used to describe the value of a control mode
is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 - SpecTRM-RL Control Mode
The rows of the tables indicate AND relationships, while the columns represent ORs. An
asterisk denotes a "don't care" condition. If any of the columns evaluates to TRUE, then the
input takes the value shown (Enabled or Disabled). For example, the Stage 1 Overpressure Fault
Protection Control Mode will transition to Enabled if the system is in Power Up (the system has
just started) or the system is not in Power Up, but the component has received a command to
enable fault protection AND the Stage 1 Overpressurization Response has never been executed
(the fault response is designed to execute only once after which the response is disabled).
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Description:
Comments:
ReferEnces:
App ears In:
Power Up
Stag 1F aultPro ttion Comm an dlnput is Enable
It1fver pre alati nn PpnnfI has Never Entered Resp onseComplete
Stage 1 FaultProtc-tion CommaindInput is Disable
Also shown in Figure 6 above the AND/OR table are attributes relevant to the control
mode specified. These attributes are included for each SpecTRM-RL element. They specify a
range of information specific to each element such as timing behaviors, obsolescence, acceptable
values, and feedback information. Attributes shared among all SpecTRM-RL elements include
descriptions, comments, and references, which are simply links to other parts of the specification
documents. As shown in Figure 6, the Control Mode element is linked to a design principle in
Level 2. Links between Level 3 blackbox elements are automatically generated by the
SpecTRM toolset.
State variables are used to model the controller's current representation of the plant or
controlled system. Examples of state variables in the PRS blackbox model include the status of
each valve and the inferred pressure states in each propellant tank, which are based on inputs
from the pressure transducers.
The logic for when state variables take particular values are also described with an
AND/OR table. The following is a description of the logic for determining a Level 1
overpressurization:
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Figure 7 - SpecTRM-RL State Variable
As specified in Level 2 (pg. 35), the design principle for declaring overpressurization
requires 2 of the 3 pressure transducers to be over the overpressure limit. This logical construct
is implemented by the state variable represented in Figure 7. The current value of the Stage 1
Overpressurization Fault Status depends on the value of the Stage 1 Overpressurization Check,
which is defined as a macro and shown in Figure 8. Macros are simply separate AND/OR tables
designed to manage the complexity of the specification.
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Stage I Overpressu reCheck
[Macro
Description: This macro deterniuines whether the Stage 1 overpressure limit has been reached. Stage 1
overpresure limit is declared when 2 out o f the 3 pressure transducers on the oi-Xidizer tanik(I
pressure transducer) and fuel taik(2 pressure transducer) has reached overpressure Stage 1 limits.
Commients: NA
References: FnulPrestoreTrinar'-.atnt: riri-irPr-vsmreTramvrlner2t~itnw
Fre1 Prew trTrmiwrlumr 1 StItu:
App ears In: Stage 1 flverpresuitimnFnaltStantui
DEFINITION
On dizerPressurTransdrliv~ Status in state OverPressure1 T T
Frel PreinreTran 'frii-r lstthm: il state OverpressulI T T*
FuelrssurieTransducer Stat-us in state OverPressurel T T
Figure 8 - SpecTRM-RL Macro
Input values are also described using an AND/OR table. An example of an input value is
shown below in Figure 9.
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OxidizerTankPressureA
Iput Valie
Sosuce: fl-rhrPireranreTraneln-er
M\'essatge: rri rlieYrPre'nireTiran'rinw A Mwresag
Possible Values (Expectel Range): 200-400 psia
Units psia
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling- N1A
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Nlin- Time- Betw een- Inputs: 0 seconds
Max-Time-Betwen-Inputs: 5 seconds
Max-Time-BEfore-First-Inpiut: 5 seconds
Related Outputs: None
Latency: NA
Min-time-after-output: NA
Exception-Handling- NA
Obsolescence: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling N A
Description: String A Input from O:idizer Pressure Transducer
Comments: NA
References: flieli -- irPr -urTrn-rhi-w Tle'tae.y l-irliii-w'riu-Traneriew..tDP.E.1
App enrs In: e rb rtaChCk-i- r e r A 2. i et-h flk Ol rhag-l Che-k
DEFINITION
= Field Pressure from fli-hPree ur-Tian ri 5 M-
Message for 0-a dh yrTankPressur A was R ceve d Ti
- Previous Value
Mvlessage for f-- rhi Li-TanPi Aiie was Reeved F
Time Since Mlvessage for f-r d rTankPrcssurc A was Last Received = 5 secoids T
= Obsolete
Powerf Up T**
Mebts S ag e fo r Q-n rb -,rlT An k~ris su rtA wa s Never Rec,-eive d *T *
Time Since Messag for 9-n rharTankPressurtA was Last ptved 5 seconds T
Metssage for n-,1 rh akrsueAWas P,.-Reeved* * F]
Figure 9 - SpecTRM-RL Input
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The input described in the figure above is a pressure reading from the pressure transducer
on the oxidizer tank. The input changes whenever a new input is received from the external
device through a message. The input takes on the previous value if a new value has not been
received within the last 5 seconds of receiving the previous input. Finally, input obsolescence is
explicitly specified if no new input is received after 5 seconds or if an input has never been
received.
Outputs are triggered based on system conditions specified in an AND/OR table. An
example of an output of the PRS blackbox model is shown in Figure 10. The output command to
close Latch Valve 1A is called when the triggering condition specified in the AND/OR table in
Figure 10 evaluates to true. In this case, the command is sent when the Stage 1 fault protection
algorithm is enabled, a Stage 1 overpressurization event has been detected, and the latch valve is
not already closed. The message contents indicate the value that the output will take.
The complete Level 3 including all other components PRS blackbox model are not
presented in the body of this thesis but can be found in the appendix.
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LatchValve lAClose
IOutput Connnan1111d
Destination: LatcalvelA
Message: Latchalv Outputiesag,-
Acceptable Values: Close
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception- Handling- Not Av, al able
Hazardous Values Open
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 5 seconds
Output Capa city Asnnptions Not Avalable
Load: Not Avalable
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: N41A
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Aval able
Exception-Handling Not Available
Feedba ck Information: See Below
Variables: Latch Valvel APo tion
Values: Close
Relationship: Value po A ti on input should tiansiti on t o Close
M-lin. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time S seconds
Exception-Handling Declare Valve as Stuck Opened
Reversed By: Latch Valve lAOpen
Description: Conunaid to Close Latch Valve 1 A
Comments: NA
References: StagelOverpressureFaultProte-tton Stage ICOve ur-atlnnFaulttatu.
Latch''alveOutput1e'sage, Latchyav A.Lat-h''aLr'elAZPosition. DP 1I
TRIGGERING CONDITION
t Cgel Arprneni ~F~it~i Prnt cdh ni in mo de Enabled T
Stage1 Ovrpr esur1"atinnFaultStatu in state Overpressure T
T At.hb' ,al-I APnatinn is Close F
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
C[OM Clos
Figure 10 - SpecTRM-RL Output
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3.5.2. Analysis
The power of having a formal model of the specification is that it enables engineers to
run mathematical analyses on the specification. SpecTRM currently has two analysis tools
available. The first checks for non-determinism, i.e., whether there is more than one transition
possible for a state or mode value given a set of inputs. If there are non-deterministic state or
mode values in the model, the design of the system is inconsistent and probably needs to be
modified.
The second analysis, called robustness, checks that for a given set of inputs, there is at
least one transition available for a state or mode value, that is, that the specification of the
behavior is logically complete.
Using these analyses, the PRS model was revised until all non-deterministic cases were
eliminated. The robustness criteria proved to be more challenging to satisfy. Robustness is a
function of how much is required of the system. A model that has non-robust cases does not
necessarily mean that the model will not satisfy all the requirements and constraints set on the
system. The analysis is extremely conservative and forces the engineer to think through all
possible cases in which a non-robust scenario might exist.
3.5.3. Simulation
Perhaps the biggest benefit of having a formal model is that it allows engineers to
simulate the specified system behavior. The behavior of the system may be viewed and tested at
an early stage in the design process, before any code is written. Multiple formal specifications
may be linked and simulated using SpecTRM. An entire formal spacecraft subsystem
specification such as the ADCS, which is created by linking specifications of individual
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components such as a PRS, RCS, IMU, and Star Tracker, may also be simulated using the
SpecTRM toolset.
Simulations of the specification can be extremely useful as designs are often changed in
the early phases of the development process. By combining various generic components, the
simulated interactions between components can be analyzed as the design evolves. In the
context of fault protection, because each generic component specification includes component
level fault protection, the subsystem fault protection software can be derived from the
combination of the various components. SpecTRM also allows users to inject faults from
various external components during simulation to determine the response of the specified fault
protection design.
The component-based spacecraft architecture described in this thesis requires that the
complete spacecraft specifications be an aggregation of individual component and subsystem-
level specifications. In order to perform a spacecraft-level simulation therefore requires the
simulation tool to be able to link multiple component and subsystem specifications together to
form a complete specification simulation environment. Currently, SpecTRM supports a two-
layer simulation environment in which one specification acts as a master to multiple slave
models. Using a generic ADCS subsystem specification and the modified PRS specification, a
subsystem-level simulation was performed. Below is a representation of the simulation
environment provided by SpecTRM.
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Si tulation T ime: 3 seconds
Simulation Status: Paused
ADCS
(Blackbox) PRS Control Mode
Frinary
Reconfiguration Request
Stage 1 Fault Protection Command
Stage 2 Fault Protection Command
Manual Control Input
Reconfiguration Reply
Ov
Supervisor
ADcs
PIRS
Control Modes
PRS Control
Mode
Pri mary
secondary
Off Nominal
Section 1,2,3,4*
Control Modes
Startup
Primary
Off Nominal
Stage 1
Fault Protection
Control Mode
Enabled
D ibed
Stage 2
Fault Protection
Control Mode
Enabled
Disabled
is r State Variables
Ov
Pr
erpressurization Latch Valve
Fault Status 1A,18,2A...*
StatusUnknown
Normal
Stage 2
erpressurization Pyrotechnic Valve
Fault Status 2A,28,3A...*
Status
UnkovmUnknown
Enabled
Fired
Oxidizer Tank Fuel Tank Pressure
essure Transducer Transducer 1 & 2*
Unknown Unknown
Normal Normal
Overpresure1 Overpressure1
Overpressure2 Overpressure2
*These elements have been compressed for
space reasons in this diagram. Each section
has its own Control Mode (see Figure 4), and
each latch valve, pyrotechnic valve, and
pressure transducer (see Figure 4) have its
own status state variable.
State Variables
Figure 11 - SpecTRM Simulation Environment
On the top left corner of Figure 11 is the simulation status.
the current simulation time and the status of the simulation, which ca
Information here represents
n be either started, stopped,
or paused. On the lower left section of Figure 11 is the simulation control box. From here, the
simulation may be started, paused, or stopped. In addition, during anytime in the simulation,
data for any input or output value may be injected into the simulation by clicking on the Inject
Data button. Within the system boundary, the current value of control modes and state variable
are highlighted in yellow. The values of inputs to the system are shown below the name of each
input and are highlighted in blue. If an output is triggered, the value of the output will also be
shown below the name of the output name. The values of outputs are recorded in a text file
format and can be analyzed following the completion of the simulation. By analyzing the inputs
and outputs of the system simulation, engineers can determine whether the specification behavior
has satisfied the requirements and constraints. For example, if inputs from two out of three
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Start Pause Stop
InjeCt Data
Latch Valve Latch
Position Valves
Open Latch Valve
Close Latch Valve
Pyro Valve Position Pyrotechnic
Valves
Enable Pyro Valve
Fire Pyro Valve
Oxidizer
Oxidizer Tank Pressure
Pressure Readings Transducer
Fuel
Fuel Tank Pressure Pressure
Readings Transducers
-7 L
pressure transducers are injected with data exceeding the Stage 1 overpressurization limit for a
period of greater than 5 seconds, the expected response should be an output command sent to the
latch valve 1A to close.
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4. Discussion
4.1. Comparison of Architectures
There is a fundamental difference between the implementation of Cassini's fault
protection software using the component-based specification reuse framework outlined in this
paper and Cassini's actual fault protection software. In Cassini, the fault protection software is
implemented as an independent entity, separate from the spacecraft's individual subsystem
software. Our implementation, in contrast, encapsulates fault protection software within each
subsystem specification. There are distinct advantages and disadvantages associated with each
architecture. A formal comparison of each architecture is beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, some general observations can be drawn.
Cassini
Spacecraft
ADCS Power Fault Protection
S/WV Subsystem S/WV S/WV
Figure 12 - Traditional Spacecraft Software Architecture
Figure 12 shows a simplified functional block diagram of a traditional spacecraft
software architecture. Each individual subsystem is controlled by its own subsystem-level
software. The software has direct access to the components on the spacecraft belonging to that
subsystem. Fault protection functions are encapsulated in a separate and distinct software
component. When a fault is detected, the fault protection software overrides the subsystem
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software, responds to the fault(s) detected, and then returns the spacecraft to normal operation or
places the spacecraft is a safe state and waits for commands from the ground station.
In contrast, the component-based spacecraft architecture described in this thesis
encapsulates fault protection in each subsystem-level software component as shown below in
Figure 13.
Cassini
Spacecraft
ADCS Power
S/W & .4 Subsystem S/W
ADCS FP & Power FP
Figure 13 - Component-Based Spacecraft Architecture
During normal operation, this architecture performs as the traditional architecture
described above. However, when a fault is detected, there is no longer a distinct controller that
has priority over all other components. Each subsystem controller must therefore communicate
with each and every other subsystem controller. An alternative architecture is described below
in Figure 14.
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Cassini
Spacecraft
Main Spacecraft
Control Software
ADCS Power
S/W & Subsystem S/W
ADCS FP & Power FP
Figure 14 - Alternative Component-Based Spacecraft Architecture
In the architecture described in the figure above, a main spacecraft control component is
introduced. This software component interfaces with each subsystem, assigns priorities for faults
detected by each subsystem, and ensures that the fault responses are carried out based on the
level of severity of each fault detected.
4.2. Possible Issues
4.2.1. Modification of Generic Specifications
The success of a generic domain-specific specification architecture relies on two
qualities: the first is the ease with which each generic specification may be modified for a
specific design. Starting from a generic PRS specification, it took one graduate student about a
day to modify the generic specification to match Cassini's fault protection design. Although the
initial generic PRS was based on a simplified version of Cassini's PRS, the time scale for
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creating the specification is still much less than the time it would have taken to build a
specification from scratch. This issue could become more pronounced as spacecraft design
evolves. The generic spacecraft component library created in this research project was intended
to prove the applicability of component-based specification reuse. To use this framework
effectively in actual spacecraft design will require the creation of many more generic component
specifications. In addition, the library should be organizational-specific, created and modified by
domain experts. Using the Cassini PRS, the research reported in this thesis has demonstrated
that spacecraft design can be achieved by composing a specification from generic component
specifications.
4.2.2. Scalability
The second challenge is scalability. So far, the component specifications and fault
protection algorithms included are all from the same subsystem, but in a real spacecraft, much of
the fault protection software is spacecraft-wide. A failure in the PRS affects the ADCS, for
example, but in order to reconfigure the system, the spacecraft must ensure that there is enough
power to carry out the reconfiguration procedures. For a typical spacecraft, this entails shutting
down all nonessential components. An extension of the spacecraft architecture will be
completed to evaluate the feasibility of applying this approach to the interactions between
subsystems, such as the ADCS and Power subsystems.
4.3. Summary
In this thesis, a new spacecraft specification method has been described. By creating a
library of generic spacecraft component specifications, a new spacecraft specification may be
created by combining component specifications. The main advantage of using this new method
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is the ability to reuse domain knowledge captured in each generic component specification. In
addition, by reusing spacecraft design at the specification-level, the issues related to reusing code
is largely avoided. Each generic specification is written as an intent specification, which
complements the component-based architecture. By using intent specifications, a model of each
component may be formally analyzed. These analyses provide a way for engineers to view and
analyze the system behavior before any costly code is implemented. SpecTRM provides a user-
friendly and powerful environment from which multiple components may be easily combined
and analyzed.
Using the component-based architecture, basic fault protection features are included in
each component and subsystem specification. Fault protection becomes an integrated component
of the spacecraft design, ensuring that requirements and constraints specific to fault protection is
taken into account in the general spacecraft design process. In addition, from the hazard analysis
integrated in intent specifications, fault protection features may be designed to mitigate defined
hazards.
Using the component-based architecture concept, a small library of spacecraft component
specifications was created. To prove the applicability of the concept, the Cassini PRS
overpressurization fault protection software was implemented by combining a generic PRS
specification and ADCS subsystem specification. The generic PRS specification, which was
based on Cassini's PRS was easily modified to match Cassini's fault protection software. Using
the analyses tools included in SpecTRM, non-determinism and robustness analyses were run on
the modified Cassini PRS specification. A simulation was then performed to test that the
specification behavior matched requirements and constraints set by Cassini's overpressurization
fault protection specification.
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Component-based spacecraft architecture differs from traditional spacecraft software
architectures because fault protection is no longer a distinct software component. Future work
would involve a formal analysis between the two architectures. More work will also be needed
to investigate the reusability and scalability of the component-based architecture. While the PRS
specification was easily modified, it was only one part of the Cassini fault protection software.
Cassini's fault protection software includes 13 separate fault detection and response algorithms
spanning across multiple subsystems. Many of the fault protection algorithms are also
spacecraft-wide and not confined within an individual subsystem as the implementation carried
out in this thesis. To formally analyze the component-based spacecraft architecture concept, a
full range of components must be completed with components from multiple subsystems. By
combining specifications from different subsystems, a more detailed analysis can be performed
on the advantages and disadvantages of component-based spacecraft architecture.
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Appendix
Pressure Regulation System Intent Specification
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Pressure Regulation System
Pages 1-32 have been ommitted from
the Archives copy. This is the most complete
version available.
33
Outputs
34
LatchValvelAOpen
Output Command
Destination: LatchValve l A
Message: LatchValveOutputMessage
Acceptable Values: Open
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Close
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 5 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: LatchValvelAPosition
Values: Open
Relationship: Value position input should transition to Open
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Declare Valve as Stuck Closed
Reversed By: LatchValve lAClose
Description: Command to Open LatchValvelA
Comments: NA
References: Section 1 ControlMode, ServisorMode, ControlMode, Latch ValveOutputMessage,
LatchValveI A, LatchValvel APosition P 1 .2.2
TRIGGERING CONDITION
35
ManualControllnput is LatchValve IAOpen T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Open
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LatchValvelAClose
Output Co
Destination: LatchValvel A
Message: LatchValveOutputMessage
Acceptable Values: Close
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Open
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 5 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: LatchValvelAPosition
Values: Close
Relationship: Value position input should transition to
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Declare Valve as Stuck Opened
Reversed By: LatchValvelAOpen
Description: Command to Close Latch Valve IA
Comments: NA
References: Stage 1 OverpressureFaultProtection. Stage l
LatchValve~ututMessage, LatchValvel A,
Close
OverpressurizationFaultStatus.
LatchValvel APosition, DP.1.2.2
TRIGGERING CONDITION
37
ManualControlInput is LatchValvelAClose T
SupervisorMode in mode PRS F T
Stage 1 OverpresurizationFaultStatus in state Overpressure * T
LatchValvel APosition is Close * F
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Close
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LatchValve 1 B Open
Output Command
Destination: LatchValve IB
Message: LatchValveOutputMessage
Acceptable Values: Open
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Close
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 5 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: LatchValvelBPosition
Values: Open
Relationship: Value position input should transition to Open
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Declare Valve as Stuck Closed
Reversed By: LatchValve1BClose
Description: Command to Open LatchValvelB
Comments: NA
References: Section 1 ControlMode. SuervisorMod, Contro1Mode, LatchValveOutputMessage
LatchValve IA, LatchValve l APosition. CDP. 1.2.2
TRIGGERING CONDITION
39
ManualControlInput is LatchValve1BOpeni IT]
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Open
40
LatchValve 1 B Close
Output Command
Destination: LatcbValve I B
Message: LatchValveOutputMessage
Acceptable Values: Close
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Open
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 5 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: LatchValvelBPosition
Values: Close
Relationship: Value position input should transition to Close
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Declare Valve as Stuck Opened
Reversed By: LatchValvelBOpen
Description: Command to Close Latch Valve lB
Comments: NA
References: Stage1 OverpressureFautProtection, Stage 1 OverpressurizationFaultStatus
LatchValveOutpiutMessage, LatchValve LatchValve l APosition ,C-DP.1.2.2
TRIGGERING CONDITION
41
ManualControllnput is LatchValvelBClose
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Close
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PyroValve 1 AEnable
Output Command
Destination: PyloValve l A
Message: PyroValveEnableMessage
Acceptable Values: Enable
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Fire
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 90 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: Not Available
Variables: NA
Values: NA
Relationship: NA
Min. time (latency): NA
Max time: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Reversed By: PyroValvelADisable
Description: Command to Enable Pyrotechnic Device.
Comments: NA
References: SupervisorMode, LatchValvel AStatus, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValvel A,
PyroValve l APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
43
SupervisorMode in mode PRS T F
Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus in state Overpressure T*
ManualControllnput is PyroValvelAEnable T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Enable
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PyroValvelAFire
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve l A
Message: PyroValveFireMessage
Acceptable Values: Fire
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: NA
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: PyroValvelAPosition
Values: Close
Relationship: PyroValvelAPosition should transition to Close
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Reversed By: NA
Description: Command to Fire Enabled Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvel AEnable, SupervisorMode, PyroValveFireMessage, PyroyalveI A,
PyroValve 1 APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
45
SupervisorMode in mo
Stage2Overpressurizat
Time Since Message f
ManualControlInput is
de PRS T F
ionFaultS.tatus in state Overpressure T
or PyroValvel AEnable was Last Sent> 90 seconds T *
PyroValvelAFire * T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Fire
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PyroValvelBEnable
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve1I B
Message: PyroValveEnableMessage
Acceptable Values: Enable
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Fire
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 90 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: Not Available
Variables: NA
Values: NA
Relationship: NA
Min. time (latency): NA
Max time: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Reversed By: PyroValvelBDisable
Description: Command to Enable Pyrotechnic Device.
Comments: NA
References: SupervisorMode, LatchValvel AStatus, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValvelA,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
47
ManualControllnput is PyroValvelBEnable IT
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Enable
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PyroValvelBFire
Output Command
Destination: PyroValveIB
Message: PyroValveFireMessage
Acceptable Values: Fire
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: NA
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
.Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: PyroValvelBPosition
Values: Close
Relationship: PyroValvelBPosition should transition to Close
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Reversed By: NA
Description: Command to Fire Enabled Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValve1 AEnable, SupervisorMod , PyroValveFireMessage, Pyroalvel A,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
49
ManualControllnput is PyroValvelBFire T
Time Since Message for PyroValvel BFnable was Last Sent> 90 seconds T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
CMFire
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PyroValve2AEnable
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve2A
Message: PyroValveEnableMessage
Acceptable Values: Enable
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Fire
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 90 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: Not Available
Variables: NA
Values: NA
Relationship: NA
Min. time (latency): NA
Max time: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Reversed By: PyroValve2ADisable
Description: Command to Enable Pyrotechnic Device.
Comments: NA
References: SupervisorMode, LatchValve 1 AStatus, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValvelA,
PyroValve 1 A Position
TRIGGERING CONDITION
51
ManualControllnput is PyroValve2AEnablel [I
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Enable
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PyroValve2AFire
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve2A
Message: PyroValveFireMessage'
Acceptable Values: Fire
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Availab
Hazardous Values: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: NA
Output Capacity Assumptions: N1
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 se
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not A
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: PyroValve2APosition
Values: Close
le
ot Available
conds
vailable
Relationship: PyroValve2APosition should transition to Close
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Reversed By: NA
Description: Command to Fire Enabled Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments:
References:
NA
PyroValvel AEnable, SupervisorMode, PyroValveFireMessage, PyroValveI A,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
53
ManualControlInput is PyroValve2AFire T
Time Since Message for PyroValve2AEnable was Last Sent > 90 seconds T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
CMFire
54
PyroValve2BEnable
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve2B
Message: PyroValveEnableMessage
Acceptable Values: Enable
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Fire
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 90 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: Not Available
Variables: NA
Values: NA
Relationship: NA
Min. time (latency): NA
Max time: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Reversed By: PyroValve2BDisable
Description: Command to Enable Pyrotechnic Device.
Comments: NA
References: SupervisorMode, LatchValvel AStatus, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValvel A,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
55
ManualControlInput is PyroValve2BEnable T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Enable
56
PyroValve2BFire
IOutput Command
Destination: PyroVa1ve2R
Message: PyroValveFireMessage
Acceptable Values: Fire
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: NA
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: PyroValve2BPosition
Values: Close
Relationship: PyroValve2BPosition should transition to Close
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Reversed By: NA
Description: Command to Fire Enabled Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvel AEnable, SupervisorMode, PyroValveFireMessage, PyroValveI A,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
57
ManualControlInput is PyroValve2BFire T
Time Since Message for PyroValve2BFnable was Last Sent > 90 seconds T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
58
PyroValve3AEnable
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve3A
Message: PyroValveEnableMessage
Acceptable Values: Enable
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Fire
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 90 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: Not Available
Variables: NA
Values: NA
Relationship: NA
Min. time (latency): NA
Max time: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Reversed By: PyroValve3ADisable
Description: Command to Enable Pyrotechnic Device.
Comments: NA
References: SupervisorMode, LatchValvel AStatus, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyrJoValvelA,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
59
ManualControlInput is PyroValve3AEnablel IT
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Enable
60
PyroValve3AFire
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve3A
Message: PyroValveFireMessage
Acceptable Values: Fire
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: NA
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: PyroValve3APosition
Values: Close
Relationship: PyroValve3APosition should transition to
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Reversed By: NA
Description: Command to Fire Enabled Pyrotechnic Valve
Comnents:
References:
Close
NA
PyroValvel AEnable, SupervisorMode, PyroValveFireMessage, PyroValve A,
PyroValve l APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
61
ManualControllnput is PyroValve3AFire T
Time Since Message for PyroValve3AEnable was Last Sent> 90 seconds T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Cidiale
CMFire
62
PyroValve3BEnable
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve3B
Message: PyroValveEnableMessage
Acceptable Values: Enable
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Fire
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 90 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: Not Available
Variables: NA
Values: NA
Relationship: NA
Min. time (latency): NA
Max time: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Reversed By: PyroValve3BDisable
Description: Command to Enable Pyrotechnic Device.
Comments: NA
References: SupervisorMode, LatchValvel AStatus, PyroValveEnabeMessage, PyroValvelA,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
63
ManualControllnput is PyroValve3BEnable T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Enable
64
PyroValve3BFire
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve3B
Message: PyroValveFireMessage
Acceptable Values: Fire
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: NA
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: PyroValve3BPosition
Values: Close
Relationship: PyroValve3BPosition should transition to Close
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Reversed By: NA
Description: Command to Fire Enabled Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvel AEnable, SupervisorMode, PyroValveFireMessage PyroValvel A.
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
65
ManualControlInput is PyroValve3BFire T
Time Since Message for PyroValve3BEnable was Last Sent > 90 seconds T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
S Fire
66
PyroValve4AEnable
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve4A
Message: PyroValveEnableMessage
Acceptable Values: Enable
Units: NA .
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Fire
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 90. seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: Not Available
Variables: NA
Values: NA
Relationship: NA
Min. time (latency): NA
Max time: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Reversed By: PyroValve4ADisable
Description: Command to Enable Pyrotechnic Device.
Comments: NA
References: SupervisorMode, LatchValvel AStatus, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValvel A,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
67
ManualControllnput is PyroValve4AEnable ]
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Enable
68
PyroValve4AFire
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve4A
Message: PyroValveFireMessage
Acceptable Values: Fire
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: NA
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: PyroValve4APosition
Values: Close
Relationship: PyroValve4APosition should transition to Close
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Reversed By: NA
Description: Command to Fire Enabled Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvel AEnable, SupervisorMode, PyroValveFireMessage, PyroValve I A,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
69
ManualControlInput is PyroValve4AFire T
Time Since Message for PyroValve4AEnable was Last Sent > 90 seconds T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Fire
70
PyroValve4BEnable
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve4B
Message: PyroValveEnableMessage
Acceptable Values: Enable
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Fire
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: 90 seconds
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: Not Available
Variables: NA
Values: NA
Relationship: NA
Min. time (latency): NA
Max time: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Reversed By: PyroValve4BDisable
Description: Command to Enable Pyrotechnic Device.
Comments: NA
References: SupervisorMode, LatchValvel AStatus, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValvej A,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
71
ManualControllnput is PyroValve4BEnable T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Enable
72
PyroValve4BFire
Output Command
Destination: PyroValve4
Message: PyroValveFireMessage
Acceptable Values: Fire
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Hazardous Values: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Initiation Delay: 0 seconds
Completion Deadline: NA
Output Capacity Assumptions: Not Available
Load: Not Available
Min time between outputs: 0 seconds
Max time between outputs: NA
Hazardous Timing Behavior: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Feedback Information: See Below
Variables: PyroValve4BPosition
Values: Close
Relationship: PyroValve4BPosition should transition to Close
Min. time (latency): 0 seconds
Max time: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Reversed By: NA
Description: Command to Fire Enabled Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvel AEnable, SupervisorMode, PyroValveFireMessage, Pyroalve l A,
PyroValvel APosition
TRIGGERING CONDITION
73
ManualControlInput is PyroValve4BFire T
Time Since Message for PyroValve4BEnable was Last Sent > 90 seconds T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
COM Fire
74
ControlModePrimaryOutput
Display Output
ADCS
Message: ControlModeOutputMessage
Acceptable Values:
Units:
Granularity:
Hazardous Values:
Update Requirements:
Update Delay:
Update Completion Deadline:
Output Capacity Assumptions:
Update Load:
Min update rate:
Max update rate:
Deletion Requirements (including data age):
Hazardous timing behavior:
Exception-Handling:
Failure Indication:
Reversed By:
Description:
Comments:
References: ControlMode, ControlModeOut putMessage, ADCS
TRIGGERING CONDITION
Time Since ControlMode Entered Primary <= 1 seconds [T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
Mode PRIMARY
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Destination:
ControlModeSecondaryOutput
Display Ouut
Destination: ADCS
Message: Contro1ModeOututMessag
Acceptable Values:
Units:
Granularity:
Hazardous Values:
Update Requirements:
Update Delay:
Update Completion Deadline:
Output Capacity Assumptions:
Update Load:
Min update rate:
Max update rate:
Deletion Requirements (including data age):
Hazardous timing behavior:
Exception-Handling:
Failure Indication:
Reversed By:
Description:
Comments:
References: ControMode, Contro1ModeutputMessag ADCS
TRIGGERING CONDITION
Time Since ControlMode Entered Secondary <= 1 seconds TI
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
76
ControlModeOffNominalOutput
Display Output
Destination: ADCS
Message: ControlModeOutputMessage
Acceptable Values:
Units:
Granularity:
Hazardous Values:
Update Requirements:
Update Delay:
Update Completion Deadline:
Output Capacity Assumptions:
Update Load:
Min update rate:
Max update rate:
Deletion Requirements (including data age):
Hazardous timing behavior:
Exception-Handling:
Failure Indication:
Reversed By:
Description:
Comments:
References: ControlMode, ControlModeutputMessage ADCS
TRIGGERING CONDITION
Time Since ControlMode Entered OffNominal <= 1 seconds T
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
Mode OFFNOMINAL
77
ReconfiguringOutput
Display Output
Destination: ADCS
Message: ReconfiguringOutputMessage
Acceptable Values: {ReconfiguringPRS}
Units: NA
Granularity: ??
Hazardous Values: ??
Update Requirements:
Update Delay:
Update Completion Deadline:
Output Capacity Assumptions:
Update Load:
Min update rate:
Max update rate:
Deletion Requirements (including data age):
Hazardous timing behavior:
Exception-Handling:
Failure Indication:
Reversed By:
Description:
Comments:
References: SupervisorMode, Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus, Stage2OverressuizationResponse,
Stage1 OverressurizationResponse, Stage l OverressurizationFaultStats,
ReconfiguringOutputMessage, ADCS
TRIGGERING CONDITION
78
MESSAGE CONTENTS
Field Value
Reconfiguring ReconfiguringPRS
79
SupervisorMode in mode PRS
Stage 1 OverpressurizationFautStatls in state Overpressure
Stage 1 OverpressurizationR esponse in state ResponseComplete
Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatu in state Overpressure
Stage2OverpressurizationResponse in state ResponseComplete
T
T
F
*
T
*
T
F
Modes
80
ControlMode
Control Mode
This is the main control mode of the PRS
NA
Section 1 ControlMode, Section2ControlMode, Section4ControlMode, Section3ControlMode, QSJ.
ControlModePrimaryutput, ControlModeSecondavutput ControlModeOffNominalOutput,
LatchValve 1 BOpen, LatchValvel AOpen, LatchValve I BClose
DEFINITION
= Primary
Section 1 ControlMode in mode Primary
Section2ControlMode in mode Primary
Section3ControlMode in mode Primary
Section4ControlMode in mode Primary
= Secondary
Section 1 ControlMode in mode Secondary
Section2ControlMode in mode Secondary
Section3ControlMode in mode Secondary
Section4ControlMode in mode Secondary
Section 1 ControlMode in mode OffNominal
Section2ControlMode in mode OffNominal
Section3ControlMode in mode OffNominal
Section4ControlMode in mode OffNominal
T
T
T
T
T
*
*
*
F
F
F
F
*
T
*
*
F
F
F
F
*
*
T
*
F
F
F
F
*
*
*
T
F
F
F
F
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
= OffNominal
Section 1 ControlMode in mode OffNominal T * * *
Section2ControlMode in mode OffNominal * T * *
Section3ControlMode in mode OffNominal * * T *
Section4ControlMode in mode OffNominal * * * T
82
Stage 1 OverpressureFaultProtection
Control Mode
Determines Stage 1 Overpressurization Fault Protection Enabled or Disabled
NA
Stage 1 OverpressurizationResnonse Stagel FaultProtectionCommandlnnut
LatchValve 1 A Close
DEFINITION
= Enabled
= Disabled
F
T
F
F
F
F
*
T
83
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Power Up
Stage1 FaultProtectionCommandlnput is Enable
Stage 1 OverpressurizationResponse has Never Entered ResponseComplete
T F
*T
*T
Power Up
Stage 1 FaultProtectionCommandlnput is Enable
Stage 1 OverpressurizationResponse has Never Entered ResponseComplete
Stage 1 FaultProtectionCommandhnput is Disable
Stage2OverpressureFaultProtection
Control Mode
Determines Stage 2 Overpressurization Fault Protection Enabled or Disabled
NA
Stage2OvemressurizationResnonse. Stage2FaultProtectionCommandTnmit
LatchValvel AClose
DEFINITION
= Enabled
= Disabled
F
T
F
F
F
F
*
T
84
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Power Up
Stage2FaultProtectionCommandlnput is Enable
Stage2OverpressurizationResponse has Never Entered ResponseComplete
T F
*IT
*T
Power Up
Stage2FaultProtectionCommandlnput is Enable
Stage2verpressurizationRespons has Never Entered ResponseComplete
Stage2FaultProtectionCommandfnput is Disable
Section 1 ControlMode
Control Mode
Section 1 Control Mode
NA
PyroValvel A Status, PyroValvel BStatus, PyroValvel APosition, PyroValve1 BPosition
Contro1ModePrimarvutput, Control~odeSecondarvutput. Contro1ModeOffNominaOutput
LatchValvelBOpen, LatchValvel AOpen, LatchValve1BClose, Contro]Mode
DEFINITION
= Startup
Power Up
= Primary
Power Up
PyroValvel APosition is Open
PyroValvel APosition is Close
PyroValvel A Status has Never Entered Fired
PyroValvel BPosition is Close
PyroValve1BPosition is Open
PyroValvel BStatus has Never Entered Fired
T
F
T
F
T
T
F
T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
= Se
=Of
condary
Power Up
PyroValvel APosition is Open
PyroValvel APosition is Close
PyroValve l A Status has Never Entered Fired
PyroValvelBPosition is Close
PyroValve1 BPosition is Open
PyroValvelBStatus has Never Entered Fired
fNominal
86
TF
F
T
F
F
T
F
Power Up
PyroValvel APosition is Open
PyroValvel APosition is Close
PyroValvel A Status has Never Entered Fired
PyrnValvelBPosition is Close
PyroValve1 BPosition is Open
PyroValve1 BStatus has Never Entered Fired
F
T
F
F
*
*
*
F
*
*
*
T
F
F
F
F
F
*
*
*
*
F
*
*
*
F
F
*
Section2ControlMode
Control Mode
Section 2 Control Mode
NA
PyroValve2AStatus, PyroVa1ye2BStatus, PyroValve2BPosition, PyroValve2APosition
ControModePrimarvuut, Contro1ModeSecondarvoutput. ControlModeOffNominalOutput,
LatchValve I31Open, LatchValvel AOpen, LatchValve1 BClose, Contro1Mode
DEFINITION
= Startup
Power Up
= Primary
Power Up
PyroValve2A Position is Open
PyroValve2APosition is Close
PyroValve2AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve2BPosition is Close
PyroValve2BPosition is Open
PyroValve2BStatus has Never Entered Fired
T
F
T
F
T
T
T
87
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
=Se
=Of
condary
fNominal
88
Power Up
PyroValve2APosition is Open
PyroValve2APosition is Close
PyroValve2AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve2BPosition is Close
PyroValve2BPosition is Open
PyroValve2BStatus has Never Entered Fired
F
F
T
F
F
T
F
Power Up
PyroValve2APosition is Open
PyroValve2APosition is Close
PyroValve2AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve2BPosition is Close
PyroValve2BPosition is Open
PyroValve2BStatus has Never Entered Fired
F
T
F
F
*
*
*
F
*
*
*
T
F
F
F
F
F
*
*
*
*
F
*
*
*
F
F
*
Section3ControlMode
Control Mode
Section 3 Control Mode
NA
PyroValve3A Status, PyroValve3BStatus, PyroVave3 A Position, PyroValve3BPosition
ControlModePrimarvOutput. ControlModeSeconc Output ControlModeOffNominalOutput,
LatchValve 1 BOpen, LatchValve 1 A Open, LatchValve 1 BClose, ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Startup
Power Up
= Primary
Power Up
PyroValve3APosition is Open
PyroValve3APosition is Close
PyroValve3AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve3BPosition is Close
PyroValve3BPosition is Open
PyroValve3BStatus has Never Entered Fired
F
T
F
T
T
F
T
89
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
= Se
= Of
condary
Power Up
PyroValve3APosition is Open
PyroValve3 APosition is Close
PyroValve3AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve3RPositinn is Close
PyroValve3BPosition is Open
PyroValve3BStatus has Never Entered Fired
fNominal
90
F
F
T
F
F
T
F
Power Up
PyroValve3APosition is Open
PyroValve3APosition is Close
PyoValve3AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve3RPo.sition is Close
PyroValve3RPosition is Open
PyroValve3BStatus has Never Entered Fired
F
T
F
F
*
*
*
F
*
*
*
T
F
F
F
F
F
*
*
*
*
F
*
*
*
F
F
*
Section4ControlMode
Control Mode
Section 4 Control Mode
NA
PyroValve4BStatus, PyroValve4AStatus, PyroValve4BPosition, PyroValve4APosition
Control~odePrimarvutput, ControlModeSecondarvutput. ControlModeOffNominalOutput,
LatchValve1BOpen, LatchValvel AOpen, LatchValve1BClose, ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Startup
Power Up
= Primary
Power Up
PyroValve4A Position is Open
PyroValve4APosition is Close
PyroValve4AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve4BPosition is Close
PyroValve4BPosition is Open
PyroValve4BStatus has Never Entered Fired
T
F
T
F
T
T
F
T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Secondary
Power Up
PyroValve4APosition is Open
PyroValve4APosition is Close
PyroValve4AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve4BPosition is Close
PyValve4BPosition is Open
PyroValve4BStatus has Never Entered Fired
= OffNominal
92
F
F
T
F
F
T
F
Power Up
PyroValve4APosition is Open
PyroValve4APosition is Close
PyoValve4AStatus has Never Entered Fired
PyroValve4BPosition is Close
PrValve4BPosition is Open
PyroValve4BStatus has Never Entered Fired
F
T
F
F
*
*
*
F
*
*
*
T
F
F
F
F
F
*
*
*
*
F
*
*
*
F
F
*
SupervisorMode
Supervisory Mode
Determines the current Supervisor of the PRS
Comment: NA
References: Stage2FaultProtectionCommandTnput, Stage 1 FaultProtection Command~nput
PyroValve4BEnable, Pyro lve1BFir, ReconfiguringOutput, PyroValve3BEnable,
PyroValvelBEnable, PyroValve2BFie, PyroValvel AEnable, LatchValve l AOpen,
PyroValvelAFir, ProValve3BFire, PyroValve3AFire, PyroValve4BFir, PyroValve2BEnable,
PyroValve3AEnable, PyroValve2A Enable, LatchValve1BOpen, PyoValve2AFire,
PyroValve4AEnable, LatchValve1BClose, PyroValve4AFir
DEFINITION
= PRS
T F F
* F*
**F
= ADCS
F
T
T
93
Description:
Appears In:
Power Up
Stage 1 FaultProtectionCommandlnput is Disable
Stage2FaultProtectionCommandnput is Disable
Power Up
Stage 1 FaultProtectionCommandlnput is Disable
Stage2FaultProtectionCommandlnput is Disable
State Values
94
LatchValvelACommand
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the last command sent to the Latch Valve
Comments: NA
References: LatchValvel AOpen, LatchValvel AClose
Appears In: LatchValve l A Status
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Power Up T F
Message for LatchValve l AOpen was Sent F T
Message for LatchValvel AClose was Sent F T
= Open
Power Up F
Message for LatchValvel A Open was Sent T
Message for LatchValvel AClose was Sent F
Close
Power Up F
Message for LatchValvelA Open was Sent F
Message for .atchValvel AClose was Sent TI
95
LatchValvelAStatus
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: LatchValvelAPosition
Description: Determines the Status of the Latch Valve
Comments: NA
References: LatchValvel ACommand, LatchValvel APosition
Appears In: PyroValve 1 AEnable
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Power Up
LatchValve I APosition is Obsolete
= Op
= Cl
en
Power Up
LatchValve 1 APosition is Open
LatchValve 1 ACommand in state Unknown
ose
96
TL*
*T
F
T
T
Power Up
LatchValvel APosition is Close
LatchValve1 ACommand in state Unknown
F
T
T
= Sti
- Sti
uckOpen
uckClose
97
Power Up
LatchValvel APosition is Open
Time Since LatchValvel ACommand Entered Close > 5 seconds
LatchValve 1 ACommand in state Close
F
T
T
T
Power Up
LatchValve 1 APosition is Close
Time Since LatchValvel ACommand Entered Open > 5 seconds
LatchValve 1 ACommand in state Open
F
T
T
T
LatchValve 1 B Command
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the last command sent to the Latch Valve
Comments: NA
References: LatchValve 1 BOpen, LatchValve 1 BClose
Appears In: LatchValve1BStatus
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Power Up T *F
Message for LatchValve 1 BOpen was Sent F T
Message for LatchValve 1 BClose was Sent F T
= Open
Power Up F
Message for LatchValve 1 BOpen was Sent T
Message for LatchValve1BClose was Sent F
= Close
Power Up F
Message for LatchValve1 BOpen was Sent F
Message for LatchValve1 BClose was Sent TI
98
LatchValve 1 B Status
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: LatchValvelBPosition
Description: Determines the status of the Latch Valve
NA
LatchValve 1 BCommand, LatchValve1BPosition
PyroValve l B~nable
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Power Up
LatchValve1 BPosition is Obsolete
= Op
= Clo
en
se
99
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
TL*
*T
Power Up
LatchValve1 BPosition is Open
LatchValve 1 BCommand in state Unknown
F
T
TI
Power Up
LatchValve 1 BPosition is Close
LatchValve 1 BCommand in state Unknown
F
T
T
uckOpen
Power Up
LatchValvel BPosition is Open
Time Since LatchValve 1 BCommand Entered Close > 5 seconds
LatchValve1 BCommand in state Close
= Sti
= Sti
100
uckClose
F
T
T
T
Power Up
LatchValve 1 BPosition is Close
Time Since LatchValve 1 BCommand Entered Open > 5 seconds
LatchValve 1 BCommand in state Open
F
T
T
T
PyroValvelAStatus
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not A
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the
Comments: NA
References: PyroValve l AEn
Appears In: Section 1 Control
vailable
Status of teh Pyrotechnic Valve
able, PyroValvelI AFire
Mode
DEFINITION
= Unknown
= En
= Fir
abled
ed
Power Up
Message for PyroValvelAFire was Sent
101
Power Up
Message for PyroValve l AEnable was Sent
Message for PyroValvel AFire was Sent
T*
* F
*IF
Power Up
Message for PyroValvel AEnable was Sent
Message for PyroValvel AFire was Sent
F
T
F
]FTI
PyroValve 1 B Status
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the statusu of the Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvel BFire, PyroValve1 BEnable
Appears In: Section 1 ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Unknown
= En
= Fir
T*
F
I F
abled
Power Up
Message for PyroValvel BEnable was Sent
Message for PyroValveIBFire was Sent
ed
F
T
F
Power Up
|Message for PyroValvel BFire was Sent
102
Power Up
Message for PyroValve1 BEnable was Sent
Message for PyValve1BFire was Sent
F
T
I
PyroValve2AStatus
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Pyrotechnic Valve
NA
PyroValve2AEnable, PyroValve2ire
Section2ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Unknown
= En
= Fir
T*
*F
*F
abled
F
T
F
ed
Power Up
Message for PyroValve2AFire was Sent
F
T
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Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Power Up
Message for PyroValve2A Enable was Sent
Message for PvroValve2AFire was Sent
Power Up
Message for PyroValve2AEnable was Sent
Message for PyrValve2AFire was Sent
PyroValve2B Status
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValve2BEnable, ProValve2BFir
Appears In: Section2ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Unknown
T*
F
*F
= Enabled
F
T
F
= Fired
Power Up
Message for PyroVa1ve2BFire was Sent
F
T
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Power Up
Message for PyroValve2BEnabl was Sent
Message for PyroValve2BFire was Sent
Power Up
Message for PvrnValve2RFnable was Sent
Message for ProValve2BFire was Sent
PyroValve3AStatus
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
NA
PyroValve3AEnable, PyroValve3AFie
Section3ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Unknown
T*
*F
*F
= Enabled
F
T
F
= Fired
Power Up
[Message for PyroValve3AFire was Sent
F
T
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Power Up
Message for PyroValve3AEnable was Sent
Message for PyroValve3AFie was Sent
Power Up
Message for PyroValve3 AEnable was Sent
Message for PyroValve3AFire was Sent
I
PyroValve3B Status
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValve3BFEnable, PyroValve3BFire
Appears In: Section3ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Unknown
= En
= Fir
abled
F
T
F
ed
Power Up
Message for PyrValve3BFire was Sent
F
T
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Power Up
Message for PrValve3Bnabl was Sent
Message for PyoValve3BFire was Sent
TL*
*F
* 1 F
Power Up
Message for PyroValve3BEnable was Sent
Message for PyroValve3BFire was Sent
PyroValve4AStatus
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValve4AEnable, PyroValve4AFi
Appears In: Section4ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Unknown
= Enabled
F
T
F
= Fired
Power Up
Message for PyroValve4AFire was Sent
F
T
107
Power Up
Message for PyoValve4AEnable was Sent
Message for ProValve4AFire was Sent
T*
*F* ~f
Power Up
Message for PyroValve4AEnable was Sent
Message for PyroValve4AFire was Sent
I
PyroValve4B Status
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Pyrotechnic Valve
Comments: NA
References: PyroValve4BEnable, PyValve4BFir
Appears In: Section4ControlMode
DEFINITION
= Unknown
TL*
*F
*F
nabled= E
= F
F
T
F
ired
Power Up
Message for PyroValve4BFire was Sent
F
T
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Power Up
Message for PrValve4BFnabl was Sent
Message for PyrValve4BFire was Sent
Power Up
Message for PyroValve4BEnabl was Sent
Message for PyrValve4BFire was Sent
OxidizerPressureTransducerStatus
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Oxidizer Pressure Transducer
Comments: NA
References: OxidizerStage2Check, OxidizerA ObsoleteCheck OxidizerBObsoleteCheck
Appears In:
OxidizerStage1Check
Stage 1 Overpressureheck, Stage2verressureCheck
DEFINITION
= Unknown
T F
*T
*T
=Normal
F
F
F
F
F
F
T
F
F
F
F
F
T
F
F
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Power Up
OxidizerAOhsoleteCheck
OxidizerBObsoleteCheck
Power Up
OxidizerAObsoleteCheck
OxidizerBObsoleteCheck
OxidizerStage 1 Check
OxidizerStage2Check
= OverPressure 1
Power Up
Oxidz7erA
OxidizerB
OxidizerSt-
OxidizerSt
=OverPressure2
ObsoleteCheck
bsoleteCheck
agelCheck
age2Check
F
F
F
T
F
F
F
F
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
F
T
F
F
T
F
F
T
T
F
F
F
T
F
T
Power Up
OxidizerAObsoleteCheck
OxidizerBObsoleteCheck
OxidizerStage1 Check
OxidizerStage2Check
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FuelPressureTransducer 1 Status
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Fuel Pressure Transducer
Comments: NA
References: Fuel l Stage 1 Check, FueI Stage2heck, Fuel I BObsoleteCheck, Fuel l AObsoleteCheck
Appears In: Stage 1 OverpressureCheck, Stage2yov ressureCheck
DEFINITION
= Unknown
T F
*T
*T
= Normal
Power Up
Fuel 1 AObsoleteCheck
Fuel 1 BObsoleteCheck
FuellStageICheck
Fuel1Stag e2Check
F
F
F
F
F
F
T
F
F
F
F
F
T
F
F
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= OverPressure 1
Power Up F F F
Fuel 1 AObsoleteCheck F T F
Fuel 1 BObsoleteCheck F F T
FuelIStageICheck T T T
FuelI1age2Check F F F
= OverPressure2
Power Up F F F
Fuel l AObsoleteCheck F T F
Fuel 1 BObsoleteCheck F F T
Fue1l StageICheck F F F
Fue11Stage2Cbeck T T T
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FuelPressureTransducer2 Status
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: Determines the status of the Fuel Pressure Transducer
Comments: NA
References: Fuel2BObsoleteCheck, Fue12Stage2Check, Fue]2StageCheck. Fuel2AObsoleteCheck
Appears In: Stage 1 OverpressureCheck, Stage2OverpressureCheck
DEFINITION
= Unknown
T F
*T
*T
= Normal
Power Up
Fuel2AObsoleteCheck
Fue2BObsoleteCheck
Fuel2Stagel Check
Fuel2Stage2Check
F
F
F
F
F
F
T
F
F
F
F
F
T
F
F
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= OverPressure 1
Power Up F F F
Fuel2AObsoleteCheck F T F
Fuel2BOhsoleteCheck F F T
Fuel2StagelCheck T T T
Fue12Stage2Check F F F
OverPressure2
Power Up F F F
Fuel2AObsoleteCheck F T F
Fue12BObsoleteCheck F F T
Fue12Stagel Check F F F
Fue12Stage2Check T T T
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Stage 1 OverpressurizationFaultStatus
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: The Stage 1 OverpresurizationFaultStatus detects a Stage 1 overpressurization event.
Comments: NA
References: Stage 1 OverpressureCheck, QDP.6
Appears In: ReconfiguringOutput, LatchValvel AClose, Stagel OverpressurizationResponse
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Power Up T
= Normal
Power Up F
Stage 1 OverpressureCheck F
= Overpressure
Power Up
Stage 1 OverpressureCheck
F
T
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Stage 1 OverpressurizationResponse
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: LatchValvelAPosition
Description: Determines the status of the Response
Comments: NA
References: Stage 1 OverpressurizationFaultStatus, LatchValve 1 APosition, JDP.7
Appears In: R econfiguringOutput, Stagel OverpressureFaultProtection
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Power Up
Stagel OverpressurizationFaultStatus in state Unknown
=Normal
Power Up
Stagel OverpressurizationFaultStatus in state Normal
LatchValve 1 APosition is Close
= Responding
Power Up
Stage 1 OverpressurizationFaultStatus in state Overpressure
Time Since Stage 1 OverpressurizationFaultStatus Entered Overpressure >= 5 second.,
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TE*
*T
F
T
F
F
T
T
= ResponseComplete
Power Up
LatchValve 1 APosition is Close
Stage 1 OverpressurizationFaultStatus has Never Entered Overpressure
117
F
T
[F
Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: NA
Description: The Stage2OverpresurizationFaultStatus detects a Stage 2 overpressurization event.
Comments: NA
References: Stage2OverpressureCheck, DP.6
Appears In: ReconfiguringOutput, Stage2OverpressurizationResponse
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Power Up T
= Normal
Power Up F
Stage2veressureCheck F
= Overpressure
Power Up F
Stage2OverpressureCheck T
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Stage2OverpressurizationResponse
State Value
Obsolescence: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Related Inputs: PyroValvelAPosition
Description Determines the status of the response
Comments: NA
References: Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus, PyroValvel APosition, ODP..
Appears In: ReconfiguringOutput, Stage2OverpressureFaultProtection
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Power Up
Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus in state Unknown
= Normal
Power Up
Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus in state Normal
F
T
= Responding
Power Up
Stage2Overpressurization FautStatus in state Overpressure
Time Since Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus Entered Overpressure >= 5 secon&
= ResponseComplete
Power Up
PyroValvel APosition is Close
Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus has Never Entered Overpressure
F
T
T
F
T
F
119
TE*
*T
Macros and Functions
120
OxidizerAObsoleteCheck
Checks validity of Input
The input is considered obsolete if it is below 200 psia or above 400 psia.
OxidizerTankPressureA
OxidizerPressureTransducerStatus
DEFINITION
T*
*T
* * T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
OxidizerTankPressuireA is Obsolete
OxidizerTankPressureA < 200
OxidizerTankPressureA > 400
OxidizerBObsoleteCheck
Macro
Checks validity of Input
The input is considered obsolete if it is below 200 psia or above 400 psia.
OxidizerTankPressureB
Oxidi7erPressureTransducerStatus
DEFINITION
T**
* T*
**T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
OxidizerTankPressureB is Obsolete
OxidizerTainkPressure <200
OxidizerTankPressureB > 400
OxidizerStage 1 Check
Checks input for Stage 1 Overpressurization Limit
NA
OxidizerTankPressure A, OxidizerTankPressureB
OxidizerPressureTransducerStatus
DEFINITION
T
T
*
*
*
*
T
T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
OxidizerTankPressureA >= 269
OxidizerfankPressureA < 300
OxidizrTankPressure >= 269
OxidizerTankPressureB < 300
OxidizerStage2Check
Macro
Checks input for Stage 2 Overpressurization Limit
NA
OxidizerTankPressureA, OxidizerTankPressureB
Oxidi zerPressureTransducerStatus
DEFINITION
T
T
T
T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
OxidizerTankPressureA >=300
OxidizerTankPressureA <= 400
OxidizerTankPressureB >=300
OxidizerTankPressure <= 400
Fuel lAObsoleteCheck
Checks validity of Input
The input is considered obsolete if it is below 200 psia or above 400 psia.
FuelTankPressurel A
FuelPressureTransducerl Status
DEFINITION
T *
* T *
* T
125
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
FuelTankPressurel A is Obsolete
FuelTankPressurel A < 200
FuelTankPressure l A > 400
Fuel 1BObsoleteCheck
IMacro
Checks validity of Input
The input is considered obsolete if it is below 200 psia or above 400 psia.
FuelTankPressure 1 B
FuelPressureTransducerl Status
DEFINITION
126
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
FuelTankPressurel RB is Obsolete
FuelTankPressurel B < 200
FuelTankPressure 1 R > 400
T * *
* T *
**T
Fuel 1 Stage 1 Check
:Macro
Checks input for Stage 1 Overpressurization Limit
NA
FuelTankPressure 1 A, FuelTankPressure1 B
FuelPressureTransducer1 Status
DEFINITION
T
T
*
*
*
T
T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
FuelTankPressure l A >= 269
FuelTankPressurel A < 300
FuelTankPressure 1>= 269
FuelTankPressure1 <300
Fuel 1 Stage2Check
MacroI
Checks input for Stage 1 Overpressurization Limit
NA
FuelTankPressure l A, FuelTankPressure 1 B
FuelPressureTransducer1 Status
DEFINITION
T
T
T
T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
FuelTankPressurel A >=300
FuelTankPressurel A <= 400
FuelTankPressurel B>=300
FuelTankPressure 1 B <= 400
Fuel2AObsoleteCheck
Checks validity of Input
The input is considered obsolete if it is below 200 psia or above 400 psia.
FuelTankPressure2A
FuelPressureTransducer2Status
DEFINITION
T *
* T *
* T
129
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Fue1TankPressure2A is Obsolete
FuelTankPressure2A < 200
Fue1ankPressure2A > 400
Fuel2BObsoleteCheck
Macro
Checks validity of Input
The input is considered obsolete if it is below 200 psia or above 400 psia.
FuelTankPressure2R
FuelPressureTransducer2Status
DEFINITION
TD*
* T *
* *F T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Fue]TankPressure2B is Obsolete
FuelankPressure2B < 200
FuelTankPressure2B > 400
Fuel2 Stage 1Check
Checks input for Stage 1 Overpressurization Limit
NA
FuelTankPressure2A, FuelTankPressure2B
FuelPressureTran sdicer2Status
DEFINITION
T
T
*
*E
T
T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
FuelTankPressure2A >= 269
FuelfankPressure2A < 300
FuelTankPressure2B >= 269
FuelTankPressure2B < 300
Fuel2Stage2Check
Macro
Checks input for Stage 1 Overpressurization Limit
NA
FuelTankPressure2A, Fue1TankPressure2B
FuelPressureTransducer2Status
DEFINITION
T
T
T
T
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
FuelfankPressure2A >=300
FuelIankPressure2A <= 400
FuelTankPressure2B >=300
FuelTankPressure2 <= 400
Stage 1 OverpressureCheck
This macro determines whether the Stage 1 overpressure limit has been reached. Stage 1
overpresure limit is declared when 2 out of the 3 pressure transducers on the oixidizer tank(1
pressure transducer) and fuel tank(2 pressure transducer) has reached overpressure Stage 1 limits.
FuelPressureTran sducer2Status OxidizerPressureTransducerStat.
FuelPressureTransducer1 Status
Stage 1 OverpressurizationFaultStatus
DEFINITION
T T
T T
*T T
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Description:
Comments: NA
References:
Appears In:
OxidizerPressureTransducerStatus in state OverPressurel
FuelPressureTransducerl Status in state OverPressurel
FuelPressureTransducer2Satus in state OverPressure1
, I.
Stage2OverpressureCheck
Macro
This macro determines whether the Stage 2 overpressure limit has been reached. Stage 2
overpresure limit is declared when 2 out of the 3 pressure transducers on the oixidizer tank(1
pressure transducer) and fuel tank(2 pressure transducer) has reached overpressure Stage 2 limits.
FuelPressureTransducer 1 Status
PyroValve4BEnable, PyroValve2BEnable, PyoVa1ve3BFEnabl, PyroValve3AErnable,
PyroValve2AEnable, PyroValve4AEnable, Stage2OverpressurizationFaultStatus
DEFINITION
T *T
T T*
*T T
134
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
OxidizerPressureTransducerStatus in state OverPressure2
FuelPressureTransducerl Status in state OverPressure2
Fue1PressureTransducer2Satus in state OverPressure2
.Y~ 7 r .., z~. .. ..~.0fn-i
Inputs
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LatchValvelAPosition
Input Value
Source: LatchValve1IA
Message: LatchValveinputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: LatchValve lAOpen, LatchValve 1AClose
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: LatchValveTnputMessage, LatchValveI A
Appears In: LatchValvel AOpen, LatchValvel AClose, LatchValvel AStatus,
Stage l OverressurizationResponse, LatcbValveA
DEFINITION
=Field Position from LatchValveTnputMessage
Message for LatchValvel APosition was Received
136
= Previous Value
Message for LatchValve l APosition was Received F
Time Since Message for LatchValve 1 APosition was Last Received <= 1 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T
Message for LatchValvel APosition was Never Received * T *
Time Since Message for LatchValve 1 APosition was Last Received <= 1 seconds * * T
Message for LatchValve 1 APosition was Received * * F
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LatchValvelBPosition
Input Value
Source: LatchValve1B
Message: LatchValveinputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: LatchValve lBOpen, LatchValve lBClose
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: LatchValvelnputMessage, LatchValvel B
Appears In: LatchValvel BOpen, LatchValve BClose, LatchValve1 BStatus, LatchValve1B
DEFINITION
= Field Position from TatchValvenputMessage
Message for LatchValve1BPosition was Received
138
TI
Previous Value
Message for LatchValve 1 BPosition was Received F
Time Since Message for LatchValve1 BPosition was Last Received <= 1 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T
Message for LatchValve 1 BPosition was Never Received * T *
Time Since Message for LatchValve 1 BPosition was Last Received > 1 seconds * * T
Message for LatchValve 1 BPosition was Received * * F
139
PyroValvelAPosition
Input Value
Source: PyroValveI A
Message: PyroValveinputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: PyroValvelAEnable, PyroValvelAFire
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvelnputfessage, PyroValve l A
Appears In: PyroValve1 BFire, ProValve4BFire, PoValve2BFir, PyroValve2A Fir, PyroValvel AEnable
PyroValve4AFir, PyroValve ire, PyroValvel AFir Py Valve3AFir,
Section 1 ControlMode, Stage2OverpressurizationResponse, PyroValve A
DEFINITION
Field Position from PyroValveinputMessage
Power Up
Message for PyroValvel APosition was Received
F
T
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= Previous Value
Power Up F
Message for PyoValvel APosition was Received F
Message for Ey 1ValveI APosition was Never Received F
= Obsolete
Power Up T*
Message for PyrValvel APosition was Never Received T
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PyroValvelBPosition
Input Value
Source: PyroValvelB
Message: PyroValveinputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: PyroValvelBEnable, PyroValvelBFire
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: PyroValveinputMessage, PyroValvelB, PyroValve2APosition
Appears In: PyroValvelBEnable, Section I ControlMode, PyroValvel B
DEFINITION
= Field Position from PyroValvelnpuftlessage
Power Up
Message for PyroValve2APosition was Received
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F
T
= Previous Value
Power Up
Message for EyrValve2APosition was Received
Message for PyrValve2APosition was Never Received
= Obsolete
Power Up
Message for PyrValve2APosition was Never Receivedj
143
F
F
F
TW
*T
I
PyroValve2APosition
Input Value
Source: PyroValve2A
Message: PyroValveinputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Available
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: PyroValve2AEnable, PyroValve2AFire
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: PyroValveinputMessage, PyroValve2A
Appears In: PyroValve4Bnable, PyroValve3BEnable, PyroValve2BEnabl, PyroVave3AFnable
PyoValve2AEnable, PyroValve4AEnable, Section2ControlMode, Pyroyalve2A,
PyroValve 1 BPosition
DEFINITION
Field Position from PyroValveinputMessage
Power Up
Message for PyroValve2APosition was Received
F
T
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= Previous Value
= Obsolete
Power Up
Power Up
Message for PrValve2 A Positi*o was Received
Message for PyrValve2APosition was Never Received
F
F
F
Message for PyroValve2APosition was Never Receivedi
TL*
*T
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I
PyroValve2BPosition
Input Value
Source: PyroValve2B
Message: PyroValveinputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: PyroValve2BEnable, PyroValve2BFire
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvenputMessage, PvoValve2B
Appears In: Section2ControlMode, PyroValve2B
DEFINITION
= Field Position from PyroValveInputMessag
Power Up F
Message for PyroValve2BPosition was Received T
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= Previous Value
= Obsolete
Power Up
Power Up
Message for yrValve2BPosition was Received
Message for yrValve2BPosition was Never Received
F
F
F
I Message for PyrValve2BPosition was Never Receivedi
I TL*
*T
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PyroValve3APosition
Input Value
Source: PyroValve3A
Message: PyroValvenputMessa
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: PyroValve3AEnable, PyroValve3AFire
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: PyroValveinputMessage, PyroVave3A
Appears In: Section3ControlMode, PyoValve3A
DEFINITION
= Field Position from PyroValvenputMessag
Power Up F
Message for PyroValve3APosition was Received T
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= Previous Value
Power Up F
Message for PyrVave3A Position was Received F
Message for yLValve3APosition was Never Received F
Obsolete
Power Up T *
Message for P Valve3APosition was Never Received * T
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PyroValve3BPosition
Input Value
Source: PyroValve3B
Message: PyroValvelnputMessa
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: PyroValve3BEnable, PyroValve3BFire
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: PyroValveinputMessage, ProValve3B
Appears In: Section3ControlMode, PyroValve3
DEFINITION
= Field Position from PyroValvelnputMessage
Power Up F
Message for PyroValve3BPosition was Received T
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= Previous Value
Power Up
Message for PoValve3BPosition was Received
Message for PyroValve3BPosition was Never Received
= Obsolete
Power Up
Message for PyoValve osition was Never Received
151
F
F
F
TL*
*T
PyroValve4APosition
Input Value
Source: PyroValve4A
Message: PyroValvelnputMessg
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: PyroValve4AEnable, PyroValve4AFire
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: PyroValveinputMessage, PyroValve4A
Appears In: Section4ControlMode, PyroValve4A
DEFINITION
Field Position from PyroValvelnputfessa
Power Up F
Message for PyroValve4APosition was Received T
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= Previous Value
= Obsolete
Power Up
Power Up
Message for PyrYalve4APosition was Received
Message for EyPoValve4APosition was Never Received
F
F
F
Message for PyrValve4APosition was Never Receivedj
TL*
*T
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I
PyroValve4BPosition
Input Value
Source: PyroValve4B
Message: PyroValvenputMessag
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Open, Close}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 1 second
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds after system startup
Related Outputs: PyroValve4BEnable, PyroValve4BFire
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Last Recorded Value of Position Sensor
Comments: NA
References: PyroValveinputMessage, PyroValve4B
Appears In: Section4ControlMode, PyroValve4B
DEFINITION
= Field Position from PyroValvenputMessage
Power Up
Message for PyroValve4BPosition was Received
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= Previous Value
= Obsolete
Power Up
Power Up
Message for FymValve4BPosition was Received
Message for PyrValve4BPosition was Never Received
F
F
F
Message for EyrQValve4BPosition was Never Received
TL*
*T
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I
OxidizerTankPressureA
Input Value
Source: OxidizerPressureTransducer
Message: OxidizerPressureTransducerAMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): 200-400 psia
Units: psia
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 0 seconds
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 5 seconds
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds
Related Outputs: None
Latency: NA
Min-time-after-output: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Obsolescence: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: String A Input from Oxidizer Pressure Transducer
Comments: NA
References: Oxidi zerPressureTransducerA Message, OxidizerPressureTransducer, QDP.3.1
Appears In: OxidizerStage2Check, OxidizerAObsoleteCheck, OxidizerStagel Check,
OxidizerPressureTransducer
DEFINITION
= Field Pressure from OxidizerPressureTransducerAMessage
Message for OxidizerTankPressureA was Received
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= Previous Value
Message for OxidizerTankPressureA was Received F
Time Since Message for OxidizerTankPressureA was Last Received <= 5 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T
Message for OxidizerTankPressureA was Never Received * T *
Time Since Message for OxidizerTankPressureA was Last Received > 5 seconds * * T
Message for OxidizerTankPressureA was Received * * F
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OxidizerTankPressureB
Iput Value
Source: OxidizerPressureTransducer
Message: OxidizerPressureTransducerBMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): 200-400 psia
Units: psia
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 0 seconds
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 5 seconds
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds
Related Outputs: NA
Latency: NA
Min-time-after-output: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Obsolescence: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: String B Input from Oxidizer Pressure Transducer
Comments: NA
References: OxidizerPressureTransducerBMessage, OxidizerPressureTransducer
Appears In: OxidizerStage2Check, OxidizerBObsoleteCheck, OxidizerStagel Check
OxidizerPressureTransducer
DEFINITION
Field Pressure from OxidizerPressureTransducerBMessage
Message for OxidizerTankPressureB was Received
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= Previous Value
Message for OxidizerTankPressureB was Received F
Time Since Message for OxidizerTankPressureB was Last Received <= 5 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T
Message for OxidizerTankPressureB was Never Received * T *
Time Since Message for OxidizerTankPressureB was Last Received > 5 seconds * * T
Message for OxidizerTankPressureB was Received * * F
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FuelTankPres sure 1 A
Input Value
Source: FuelPressureTransducer1
Message: FuelPressureTransducerl AMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): 200-400 psia
Units: psia
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 0 seconds
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 5 seconds
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds
Related Outputs: NA
Latency: NA
Min-time-after-output: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Obsolescence: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: String A Input from Fuel Pressure Transducer 1
Comments: NA
References: Fue1PressureTransducer1 A Message, Fuel PressureTransducer 1
Appears In: Fuell Stage1 Check, Fue1I Stage2heck, Fuel 1 AObsoleteCheck, FuelPressureTransducer1
DEFINITION
= Field Pressure from FuelPressureTransducerl AMessage
Message for FuelTankPressure 1 A was Received
T
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I
= Previous Value
Message for FuelTankPressurel A was Received F
Time Since Message for FuelTankPressurel A was Last Received <= 5 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T**
Message for FuelTankPressurel A was Never Received * T
Time Since Message for FuelTankPressurel A was Last Received > 5 seconds * * T
Message for FuelTankPressurel A was Received * * F
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FuelTankPres sure 1 B
Input Value
Source: FuelPressureTransducer 1
Message: FuelPressureTransducer 1 BMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): 200-400 psia
Units: psia
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 0 seconds
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 5 seconds
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds
Related Outputs: NA
Latency: NA
Min-time-after-output: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: String B Input from Fuel Pressure Transducer 1
Comments: NA
References: FuelPressureTransducer1 BMessage, Fuel PressureTransducer 1
Appears In: Fuell Stagel Check, Fuel1 Stage2Check, Fuel 1BObsoleteCheck, FuelPressureTransducerl
DEFINITION
= Field Pressure from FuelPressureTransducer1 BMessage
Message for FuelTankPressure B was Received IT
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= Previous Value
Message for FuelTankPressurel B was Received F
Time Since Message for FuelTankPressurel B was Last Received <= 5 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T **
Message for FuelTankPressurel B was Never Received * T *
Time Since Message for FuelTankPressurel B was Last Received> 5 seconds * * T
Message for FuelTankPressurel B was Received * * F
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FuelTankPressure2A
Input Value
Source: FuelPressureTransducer2
Message: FuelPressureTransducer2AMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): 200-400 psia
Units: psia
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 0 seconds
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 5 seconds
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds
Related Outputs: NA
Latency: NA
Min-time-after-output: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling:
Description: String A Input from Fuel Pressure Transducer 2
Comments: NA
References: FuelPressureTransducer2A Message, FuelPressureTran sducer2
Appears In: Fuel2Stage2Check, Fuel2StagelCbeck, Fuel2AObsoleteCheck, Fue]PressureTransducer2
DEFINITION
= Field Pressure from FuelPressureTransducer2A Message
Message for FuelTankPressure2A was Received IT
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= Previous Value
Message for FuelTankPressure2A was Received F
Time Since Message for FuelTankPressure2A was Last Received <= 5 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T
Message for FuelTankPressure2A was Never Received * T *
Time Since Message for FuelTankPressure2A was Last Received > 5 seconds * * T
Message for FuelTankPressure2A was Received * * F
165
FuelTankPressure2B
Input Value
Source: FuelPressureTransducer2
Message: FuelPressureTransducer2BMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): 200-400 psia
Units: psia
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: NA
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: 0 seconds
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: 5 seconds
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: 5 seconds
Related Outputs: NA
Latency: NA
Min-time-after-output: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 5 seconds
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: String B Input from Fuel Pressure Transducer 2
Comments: NA
References: FuelPressureTransducer2BMessage, FuelPressureTransducer2
Appears In: Fuel2BObsoleteCheck, Fuel2Stage2Cbeck, Fuel2Stage1 Check, FuelPressureTransducer2
DEFINITION
= Field Pressure from FuelPressureTransducer2BMessage
Message for FuelTankPressure2B was Received IT
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= Previous Value
Message for FuelTankPressure2B was Received F
Time Since Message for FuelTankPressure2B was Last Received <= 5 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T **
Message for FuelTankPressure2B was Never Received * T
Time Since Message for FuelfankPress=ur2B was Last Received > 5 seconds * * T
Message for FuelTankPressure2B was Received * * F
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Stage 1 FaultProtectionCommandInput
Control Input
Source: ADCS
Message: FaultProtectionCommandnputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Enable, Disable}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: See Below
Load: Not Available
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: NA
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: This input tells the PRS controller whether to enable or disable Stage 1 Overpressurizationfault
protection.
Comments: NA
References: FaultProtectionCommandTnputMessage, ADCS
Appears In: Stage 1 OverpressureFaultProtection, SupervisorMode, ADCS
DEFINITION
= Field COM from FaultProtectionCommandlnputMessage
Power Up
Message for Stage1FaultProtectionCommandinput was Received
= Previous Value
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F
T
F
F
F
Power Up
Message for Stage1 FaultProtectionCommandlnput was Received
Message for Stage1 FaultProtectionCommandlnput was Never Receivec
= Obsolete
Power Up T *
Message for Stagel FaultProtectionCommandlnput was Never Receivec * T
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Stage2FaultProtectionCommandlnput
Control Input
Source: ADCS
Message: FaultProtectionCommandlnputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Enable, Disable}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: NA
Load: NA
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: NA
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: This input tells the PRS controller whether to enable or disable Stage2 Overpressurizationfault
protection.
Comments: NA
References: FaulItProtectionCommandTnputMessag, AJDCS
Appears In: Stage2OverressureFaultProtection. SupervisorMode. ADCS
DEFINITION
= Field COM from FaultProtectionCommandTnputMessage
Power Up F
Message for Stage2FaultProtectionCommandlnput was Received T
= Previous Value
Power Up F
Message for Stage2FaultProtectionCommandlnput was Received F
Message for Stage2FaultProtectionCommandInput was Never Receivec F
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= Obsolete
Power Up T
Message for Stage2FaultProtectionCommandinput was Never Received * T
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ManualControllnput
Control Input
Source: ADCS
Message: ManualControlInputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): See Message
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: NA
Load: NA
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: NA
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 1 second
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: Manual Commands are sent through this input
Comments: NA
References: Manual ControlInputMessage, ADCS
Appears In: ADCS
DEFINITION
= Field COM from ManualControlnputMessag
Message for ManualControlinput was Received IT
= Previous Value
Message for ManualControlinput was Received F
Time Since Message for ManualControlinput was Last Received <= 1 seconds T
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= Obsolete
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Power Up
Message for ManalControlInput was Never Received
Time Since Message for ManualControlinput was Last Received > 1 seconds
Message for ManualControlinput was Received
T
*
*
*
*
T
*
*
*
*
T
F
ResponseReadyInput
Input Value
Source: ADCS
Message: ResponseReadyInputMessage
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Ready}
Units: NA
Granularity: NA
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Timing Behavior: NA
Load: NA
Min-Time-Between-Inputs: NA
Max-Time-Between-Inputs: NA
Max-Time-Before-First-Input: NA
Related Outputs: ReconfiguringOutput
Latency: Not Available
Min-time-after-output: Not Available
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Obsolescence: 120 seconds, this is the maximum alotted fault protection response time
Exception-Handling: Not Available
Description: This input from the ADCS is required before the PRS may perform any reconfiguration.
Comments: NA
References: ResponseReadyinputMessage, ADCS
Appears In: ADCS
DEFINITION
Field Ready from ResponseReadvTnputMessage
Message for ResponseReadynput was Received T
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= Previous Value
Message for ResponseReadlnput was Received F
Time Since Message for ResponseReadyinput was Last Received <= 120 seconds T
= Obsolete
Power Up T
Message for ResponseReadyInput was Never Received * T *
Time Since Message for ResponseReadynput was Last Received > 120 seconds * * T
Message for R esponseReadyInput was Received * * F
175
Messages
176
ControlModeOutputMessage
Message
Control Mode Output Message
ControlModePrimaryOutput, Contro1ModeSecondarvOutput ControlModeOffNominaOutput,
ADCS
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start BitI End BitIIMode {PRIMARY, SECONDARY, OFFNOMINAL}
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
177
Description:
Comments: NA
References:
Appears In:
ReconfiguringOutputMessage
Message
Reconfiguring Output Message
NA
ReconfiguringOut, ADCS
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type
Reconfiguring {Rec
Start Bit End Bit
onfiguringPRS}
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
178
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:.
Respons eReadylnputMes sage
Message
Description: Response Ready Message
Comments: NA
References:
Appears In: AfDCS, ResponseReadyhnput
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
Ready {Ready}
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
179
FaultProtectionCommandInputMessage
Description:
Message
Fault Protection Command Input Message
Comments: NA
References:
Appears In: ADCS, Stage2FaultProtectionCommandInput, Stage1 FaultProtectionCommandlnput
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type I Start BitI End BitI
COM {Enable, Disable} I I
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
180
ManualControllnputMessage
Message
Manual Control Message
Comments: NA
References:
ADCS, ManualControlinput
DATA REPRESENTATION
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
181
Description:
Appears In:
,nable,PyroValvelBFire,PyroValve2A~nable,PyroValve2AFire,PyroValve2BEnable,PyroValve2BFire,PyroValve3,
LatchValveOutputMes sage
Message
Latch Valve Output Message
Comments: NA
References:
LatchValvelBOpen, LatchValvel AOpen, LatchValve1BClose, LatchValvel AClose,
LatchValvel , LatchValvel
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
COM Latch Valve Command {Open, Close} 0 0
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
COM Latch Valve Command
182
Description:
Appears In:
LatchValvelnputMessage
Message
Latch Valve Input Message
Comments: NA
References:
LatchValvelB, LatchValvel A, LatchValve1 BPosition, LatchValve l APosition
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
Position Latch Valve Position {Open, Close} 0 0
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
COM Latch Valve Position
183
Description:
Appears In:
PyroValvelnputMe s sage
Message
Pyrotechnic Valve Input Message
Comments: NA
References:
PyroValve3A, PyoValve1B, PoValve2B, PyroValve4A, PyroValve2A,PyoValve3B,
PyroValve4B, PyroValvelA, PyroValve2BPosition, PyroValve3APosition,
PyroValve3BPosition, PyroValvel A Position, PyroValve4BPosition, PyroValvel BPosition,
PyroValve4APosition, PyroValve2APosition
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
Position Pyro Valve Position {Open, Close} 0 0
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
COM Latch Valve Position
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Description:
Appears In:
PyroValveEnableMes sage
Message
Pyrotechnic Valve Enable Message
Comments: NA
References:
PyroValve4BEnable. PyroValve3BEnable, PyroValve2BEnable, PyroValve3AEnable,
PyroValve1BEnable, PyroValve2AEnable, PyroValve4A Enable, PyroValvel AEnable,
PyValve3 A PyroValve1B, PyroValve2B, PyroValve4A. PyroValve2A. PyroValve3B,
PvroValve4B, PaoValvel A
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start BitI End BitI
COM Pyro Valve Command {Enable} j0 0
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
COM Pyro Valve Command
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Description:
Appears In:
PyroValveFireMe s sage
Message
Description: Pyrotechnic Valve FireMessage
Comments: NA
References:
Appears In: PyroValveIBFire, PyroValve4BFie, PyValve2BFire, PyroValve2AFir, ProValve4AFie,
PyroValve3BFire, PyroValvel AFire, PyValve3AFi PyroValve3A. PyroValvelB,
PoValve2B, PyroValve4A,PyroValve2A, PyroValve3B, PyroValve4B-,PyroValvelA
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
COM Pyro Valve Fire {Fire} 0 0
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
COM Pyro Valve Command
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OxidizerPressureTransducerAMessage
Description:
Message
Oxidizer Pressure Transducer Message
Comments: NA
References:
Appears In: OxidizerPressureTransducer, OxidizerTankPressure A
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description TypeI S
Pressure Pressure Reading of Oxidizer Tank Real 0
tart Bit End Bit
255
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
Pressure Pressure Reading of Oxidizer Tank
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OxidizerPressureTransducerBMessage
Message
Oxidizer Pressure Transducer Message
Comments: NA
References:
OxidizerPressureTransducer, 0xidizerTankPressureB
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
Pressure Pressure Reading of Oxidizer Tank Real 0 255
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
Pressure Pressure Reading of Oxidizer Tank
188
Description:
Appears In:
FuelPressureTransducer 1 AMes sage
Message
Fuel Pressure Transducer Message
NA
FuelPressureTran sducer l, FuelTankPressure l A
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
Pressure Pressure Reading of Fuel Tank Real 0 255
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
Pressure Pressure Reading of Oxidizer Tank
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
FuelPressureTransducer 1 BMessage
Message
Fuel Pressure Transducer Message
Comments: NA
References:
FuelPressureTransducer1, FuelTankPressurel B
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
Pressure Pressure Reading of Fuel Tank Real 0 255
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
Pressure Pressure Reading of Oxidizer Tank
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Description:
Appears In:
FuelPre s sureTransducer2AMes sage
Message
Description: Fuel Pressure Transducer Message
Comments: NA
References:
Appears In: FuelPressureTransducer2, FuelTankPressure2A
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description
Pressure Pressure Reading of Fuel Tank
Type Start Bit End Bit
Real 0 255
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
Pressure Pressure Reading of Oxidizer Tank
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FuelPres sureTransducer2BMessage
Message
Fuel Pressure Transducer Message
Comments: NA
References:
FuelPressureTransducer2, FuelTankPressure2B
DATA REPRESENTATION
Field Name Description Type Start Bit End Bit
Pressure Pressure Reading of Fuel Tank Real 0 255
FIELD DESCRIPTIONS
Field Description
Pressure Pressure Reading of Oxidizer Tank
192
Description:
Appears In:
Devices
193
ADCS
Device
ADCS Controller
NA
FaultProtectionCommandlnputMessage, ResponseReadyInputMessage.
R econfi gurin gOutputMessage. Manual ControlInputMessage, ControlModeutputMessage
ControM drimarv2uput. ReconfiguringOutput Contro1ModeSecondvutput
C , ManualControlinput, Stage2FaultProtectionCommandlnput,
StageJ FaultProtectionCommandlnput, ResponseReadnput
DATA PORTS
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Message URI
ControlModeOutputMessage relativefile:PRS/ControlModeOutput.sim
ReconfiguringOutputMessage relativefile:PRS/Reconfiguring.sim
ResponseReadylnputMessage relativefile:PRS/ResponseReady.sim
FaultProtectionCommandlnputMessage relativefile:PRS/StagelCOM.sim
FaultProtectionCommandlnputMessage relativefile:PRS/Stage2COM.sim
ManualControllnputMessage relativefile:PRS/ManualControl.sim
LatchValvelA
Device
Latch Valve 1A
NA
LatchValveInputMessage, LatchValveutputMessage
LatchValvel A Open, LatchValvel AClose, LatchValve 1 APosition
DATA PORTS
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Message URI
LatchValveOutputMessage relativefile:PRS/LatchValvelAOutput.sim
LatchValveInputMessage relativefile:PRS/LatchValvelAInput.sim
LatchValvelB
Device
Latch Valve lB
NA
LatchValveinputMessage, TatchValveOutputMessag
LatchValvelBOpen, LatchValve1BClose, LatchValve1BPosition
DATA PORTS
Message URI
LatchValveOutputMessage relativefile:PRS/LatchValvelBOutput.sim
LatchValvelnputMessage relativefile:PRS/LatchValvelBInput.sim
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
PyroValvelA
Device
Pyrotechnic Valve 1A
NA
PyroValvenputMessag, PyroValveEnab1eMesage, PyroValveFireMessage
PyroValvel AEnable, PyroValvel AFire, PyroValvel APosition
DATA PORTS
Message URI
PyroValveInputMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValvelAInput.sim
PyroValveEnableMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValvelAEnable.sim
PyroValveFireMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValvelAClose.sim
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
PyroValvelB
Device
Description: Pyrotechnic Valve lB
Comments: NA
References: PyroValvelnputMessagePyroValvenableMessage, PyroValveFireMessage
Appears In: PyoValvejFlire, PyroValve1'BEnable, PyroValvelBPosition
DATA PORTS
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Message URI
PyroValveInputMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValvelBInput.sim
PyroValveEnableMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValvelBEnable.sim
PyroValveFireMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValvelBClose.sim
PyroValve2A
Device
Pyrotechnic Valve 2A
NA
PyroValveInputMesag, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValveFireMessage
PyroValve2AEnable, PyroValve2AFire, PyroValve2APosition
DATA PORTS
Message URI
PyroValvelnputMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve2AInput.sim
PyroValveEnableMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve2AEnable.sim
PyroValveFireMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve2AClose.sim
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
PyroValve2B
Device
Pyrotechnic Valve 2B
NA
PpPyroValveFnab1eMessage, PoValveFireMessage
PyroValve2BEnable, PyroValve2BFire, PyroValve2BPosition
DATA PORTS
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Message URI
PyroValvelnputMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve2BInput.sim
PyroValveEnableMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve2BEnable.sim
PyroValveFireMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve2BClose.sim
PyroValve3A
Device
Pyrotechnic Valve 3A
NA
PyroValveinputMessage PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValveFireMessage
PyroValve3 AEnable, PyroValve3AFire, PyroValve3APosition
DATA PORTS
Message URI
PyroValvelnputMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve3AInput.sim
PyroValveEnableMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve3AEnable.sim
PyroValveFireMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve3AClose.sim
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
PyroValve3B
Device
Pyrotechnic Valve 3B
NA
PyroValveInputMeage, PyroValvenabeMessage, PyroValveFireMessage
PyroValve3BEnable, PyroValve3BFire, PyroValve3BPosition
DATA PORTS
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Message URI
PyroValveInputMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve3BInput.sim
PyroValveEnableMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve3BEnable.sim
PyroValveFireMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve3BClose.sim
PyroValve4A
Device
Pyrotechnic Valve 4A
NA
PyroValvelnputMess PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValveFireMessage
PyroValve4AEnable, PyroValve4AFire, PyroValve4APosition
DATA PORTS
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Message URI
PyroValveInputMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve4AInput.sim
PyroValveEnableMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve4AEnable.sim
PyroValveFireMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve4AClose.sim
PyroValve4B
Device
Pyrotechnic Valve 4B
NA
PyroValve~nutMessag, PyroValveEnableMessage, PyroValveFireMssag
PyroValve4BEnable, PyroValve4BFir, PyroValve4BPosition
DATA PORTS
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Message URI
PyroValveInputMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve4BInput.sim
PyroValveEnableMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve4BEnable.sim
PyroValveFireMessage relativefile:PRS/PyroValve4BClose.sim
OxidizerPressureTransducer
Device
Oxidizer Pressure Transducer
NA
OxidizerPressureTransducerA Message, OxidizerPressureTransducerBMessage
OxidizerTankPressure A, OxidizerTankPressureR
DATA PORTS
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Message URI
OxidizerPressureTransducerAMessage relativefile:PRS/OxidizerTransducerA.sim
OxidizerPressureTransducerBMessage relativefile:PRS/OxidizerTransducerB.sim
FuelPressureTransducerl
Device
Fuel Prressure Transducer 1
NA
FuelPressureTransducer1 BMessage, FuelPressureTransducer1 A Message
FuelTankPressure 1 A, FuelTankPressure B
DATA PORTS
206
Description:
Comments:
References;
Appears In:
Message I URI
FuelPressureTransducer1AMessage relativefile:PRS/FuelTransducer1A.sim
FuelPressureTransducer1BMessage relativefile:PRS/FuelTransducerlB.sim
FuelPressureTransducer2
Device
Fuel Prressure Transducer 2
NA
Fue PressureTransducer2AMessage.FuelPressureTransducer2BMessa 
FuelTankPressure2A, Fue1TankPressure2B
DATA PORTS
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Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears In:
Message URI
FuelPressureTransducer2AMessage relativefile:PRS/FuelTransducer2A.sim
FuelPressureTransducer2BMessage relativefile:PRS/FuelTransducer2B.sim

